Since its inception, the IPCS has been working on various issues related to disarmament, especially Nuclear Disarmament. We are the only research institute in South Asia that focuses on all aspects of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including Chemical, Biological and Radiological weapons.

The Institute has undertaken numerous projects, both on an individual and collaborative basis, on the issue of WMDs.

The Nuclear Security Project aims to strengthen the Institute’s efforts on the above issues.

This project is supported by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
In preparation for the NPT RevCon in 2010, President Barack Obama made a historic speech on nuclear disarmament on 5 April 2009 in Prague, followed by an 11-point approach by the Japanese Foreign Minister. A number of steps, therefore, will hopefully be taken to address the issue. The IPCS will be following these developments closely and this is the first in a series of meetings that the Institute will be organizing.

- Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee
  Director, IPCS

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, as a part of its Nuclear Security Project organized a panel discussion on 8 May 2009, to analyse the implications of Barack Obama’s speech on nuclear disarmament in Prague.

The discussions were led by Amb. Arundhati Ghose, former Permanent Representative of India to the UN Conference on Disarmament; Rear Adm. Raja Menon, Chairman, Task Force on Net Assessment and Simulation in the National Security Council; Prof. PR Chari, Research Professor, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies; and Dr. G. Balachandran, Visiting Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis.

Following is the report of this workshop, which was widely attended.

CONTENTS
Report
Obama and Nuclear Disarmament: An Indian Critique

Annexures
Document: Obama’s Prague Speech
IPCS Article: The Prague Spring
IPCS Article: A New Push
President Barack Obama’s speech on nuclear weapons elimination in Prague is similar to the 1968 Prague uprising in the sense that high expectations have been raised of concrete steps by the US and other nuclear weapon states towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, which in the President’s own words may not be accomplished in his lifetime.

Since Obama’s April speech, the reports of two bipartisan US task forces have been made public. One, a congressionally mandated Commission on Strategic Posture of the US chaired by William Perry and co-chaired by James Schlesinger and the other, a task force of the Council for Foreign Relations chaired by Perry and Brent Scowcroft. While both the task forces have agreed on the need for resumption of negotiations with Russia on START and reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons, they also agree with Obama’s view that prevailing conditions did not allow the elimination of nuclear weapons. They also agree that a safe and secure nuclear force was needed to reassure America’s allies. To quote a report, this reassurance was necessary, without which protection, those allies might seek nuclear weapons. The reference here is to Japan and the situation it faces in the Korean peninsula.

The two task forces, however, do no agree on the CTBT. While the CFR agrees that the CTBT should be ratified by the US, the congressionally mandated task force disagrees on the same. The earlier administration- the Secretaries of Defence and Energy- had made a proposal to the US Congress that the CTBT could be ratified provided the Congress approved the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW).

Another factor that has to be considered is that it is not just Obama who is going to deal with the issue, the administration and inputs from various people, who come from the old democratic background, are equally important. They seem to promote the “old agenda” or are making suggestions which are not relevant to the present day threat. When all these factors are taken into account, the Prague statement underlining “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” and that “(the US) will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our (US) national security strategy and urge others to do the same,” is possibly aimed at smoothening the way towards the NPT RevCon of 2010. This is because of a growing concern of the possible failure of the RevCon. Therefore, several countries, particularly the UK, Japan and Australia have set up commissions on nuclear disarmament. However, this resurgence is only declaratory at the disarmament level and very specific on the non-proliferation level. Therefore, these efforts are aimed at ensuring that the RevCon does not fail because of the challenges posed by Iran and DPRK, the possibility of the nuclear arsenals of the Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNA) falling under the control of people of extremist persuasion, and the present inability of the NPT to deal with these challenges, which Obama recognizes in his speech. He said, “Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one (bomb). Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered in a global nonproliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point when the centre cannot hold.” The centre not holding is the danger of the failure of the RevCon next year and therefore there is a great effort being made to show the non-nuclear weapon states that there is some movement on nuclear disarmament.

There are very few, in fact none at all, new disarmament initiatives in Obama’s speech. Even on the non-proliferation side, the agendas are old - the CTBT, the FMCT, the PSI and the global initiative to counter nuclear terrorism.
His announcement of ‘a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years’ is an extension of the idea of the FMCT and its voluntary counterpart, the FMCI. It is, however, interesting to note that Obama has supported mechanisms set up by the Bush Administration which are outside the NPT i.e. the PSI and the global initiative to counter nuclear terrorism. It is, therefore, the tenor, and not the substance which has changed.

The forthcoming RevCon is in for a very difficult time because while pursuing the nonproliferation agenda, the US continues to hold that it needs to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent force. However, Obama, a master manipulator of public opinion, is likely to paper over the difficulties at the RevCon. This is going to be an issue of the image of President Obama and his popularity internationally. Obama could have included proposals on security assurances, on de-legitimization of nuclear weapons and so on. However, none of this was included in his speech. Therefore, progress towards elimination of nuclear weapons is not on the cards, it is just a chimera.

To conclude, it is necessary for India, in the context of nuclear disarmament, to start thinking of the what, why and how of any particular position that it takes on nuclear disarmament. It is necessary for India to think about security assurances, the very reason why it is not a signatory to the NPT, and if it comes to the CD, India should have a position. This is not to say that India should not favour nuclear weapons elimination; however, India should reach this ideal on the understanding that it is in its security interests. India weaponized because of security reasons and if it is to de-weaponize, it must be for security interests as well.

Rear Adm. Raja Menon

Obama’s speech, which is about 14 points, can be classified into four groups. First, the Obama administration completely agrees with the American Quartet. Second, Obama has committed to work with Russia on Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and civil reactors. Third, he is going to work with Russia on extending the provisions of START to the Moscow treaty. Apart from these, there are three other issues. One is the concessions that the United States is now prepared to make regarding Article VI, because the argument in the NPT PrepCom made by the rest of the world is that the US has no right to talk about Article I and IV when it has done nothing with respect to Article VI. Therefore, Obama has proposed steps that the US intends to pursue. It will seek verifiable reduction to the global stockpile dramatically by the end of his Presidency; strengthen NPT and before that he is going to come with a US nuclear posture review; go down to START treaty levels immediately in agreement with Moscow; and expand the INF Treaty so that it becomes universal. Second is the issue about global efforts for a verifiable FMCT and ‘global efforts’ means that it is aimed at just two countries – India and Pakistan. Third is the link between China’s objections to no concessions being given on non-weaponization of space. So the worldwide ban on weapons that could interfere with military and commercial satellites is one of the 14 points that Obama has come up with. Fourth is the issue of the CTBT, which is also aimed at India and Pakistan.

With regard to India, one should realize that this is a seminal event; something seminal is happening in the nuclear life of the world but there are two aspects when the country (India) approaches this event. One is the country must do certain things; the second is that the negotiators in this country must say certain things. However, in the history of seminal nuclear events, India has done nothing. In 1969, when the NPT came up, India had not tested, but it wanted to be a nuclear power; therefore India did not sign the NPT. Five years later, in 1974, India tested; however, it failed to weaponize for the next 25 years. As a result, when the
CTBT came up in 1995, India tried to test but failed. It was, however, aware that the CTBT was coming up but the country was not prepared and therefore arrived at a situation (in 1995) of not having had an internal discussion on what it should do to prepare for that event. Now, this event provides another chance for India. So what is it that India will do to prepare for this event? What does India propose doing about the fact that this is a milestone in the nuclear history?

What is the situation as far as the FMCT is concerned? The nuclear arsenals of the P4 – the US, Russia, France and the UK – are now going downwards. So this whole business about stocks of fissile material is not relevant in their case. Fissile material of the nuclear weapon powers is classified into two categories – fissile material in weapons and fissile material in headstock. The fissile material in headstock of the US and Russia is astronomical compared to the fissile material in their weapons. The UK has a higher ratio of fissile material in headstock, and so has France. Therefore, none of these countries are affected by the FMCT because they have huge amounts of fissile material in stock.

China has adequate stocks of fissile material; it had manufactured huge quantities of fissile material by the mid-1970s and the Chinese warheads have now come down from the 7/4/3 megaton lethality to kilo tonnage. Therefore, China does not face any shortage of fissile material. That leaves out Israel, Pakistan and India. Israel falls in the category of satisfied nuclear power, meaning a nuclear power which, whether granted this status by the NPT or not, has adequate weapons for what it thinks it requires for the next 25-30 years. This also includes an adequate stock of fissile material with which, even if the FMCT comes in, it still has the sovereign right to make new weapons.

This leaves India and Pakistan and the latter is building a plutonium reactor II (same size as Dhruva) and probably a plutonium reactor III. The big mystery, however, is why is Pakistan, which has had a uranium bomb production line, suddenly making plutonium? This has to be tied to the fact that the delivery capability of Pakistan is changing dramatically. Other than this, there is the fact that India has already stated that its Fast Breeder Reactor, which is not operational yet, is part of its weapon programme. Therefore, a calculation is going to be made on what will happen first – the FMCT, India’s Fast Breeder or Pakistan’s plutonium reactor. These are all questions of seminal importance to India because when the FMCT materialises, India should not be in the same situation as it was when the NPT was negotiated. Going against an international treaty like the FMCT today will not be the same as going against the NPT in 1969. The stocks of fissile material the country thinks has no relationship with the arsenal. The arsenal can be stabilized much after the FMCT comes into force because only the production of FM stock for military purposes will be stopped when the treaty comes in effect.

These are very serious issues and India has to decide what it wants to do before it is confronted with problems at international conferences.

Prof. PR Chari

If one reads Obama’s speech carefully, all he says is that, the threat of nuclear war is down, but the risk of nuclear attack is up, more nations have got nuclear weapons, nuclear tests are continuing, nuclear technology is spreading, nuclear black market trade is increasing and more importantly “the centre cannot hold.” So after sketching this scenario, Obama has presented a gloomy picture to provide the back drop for having a world without nuclear weapons.

Therefore, the steps suggested by him are CTBT ratification, ending fissile material production for military purpose, strengthening the NPT
which really involves strengthening inspection regimes and punishing violators, providing access to nuclear (atomic) power without compromising the international nuclear regime and, that apart, he emphasizes the dangers of WMD terrorism as an aspect of the terrorism threat, which, according to him, requires that terrorists be denied access to nuclear weapons and fissile material stocks. For that he suggests the instrumentality of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism to which the United States and Russia have recommitted themselves. This global initiative and the threat picture that WMD terrorism is extremely important have been confirmed by the State Department’s annual report on Global Terrorism that has been recently made public.

There are two acid tests facing Obama and they come from two aberrant nations in the international system. The first is North Korea and the second is Iran. North Korea flight tested a very long missile on the very day on which the Prague address was delivered by Obama. Obama asserted that violators must be punished and on that basis North Korea needs to be punished; however, Obama has simultaneously called for global cooperation. North Korea has walked out of the six party talks and perhaps wants to draw the US into direct negotiations, apart from the six party talks. However, if the US was to take part in direct negotiations with the DPRK, it would sow dissent in the six party talks. Russia and China would feel that this is meant to short circuit them and it would create problems between the six parties themselves. As DPRK moves further and further towards nuclearization, reunification of the two Koreas will become impossible, for it is unlikely that South Korea would join a pariah state. What we have is a developing situation that could lead to the nuclearization of DPRK followed by South Korea, and what happens then in Japan? This course of events will immensely complicate the Northeast Asian strategic scene. This is a challenge to Obama and to his thesis that one could proceed towards a world without nuclear weapons.

The other challenge is Iran. Obama said that Iran could be permitted access to nuclear (atomic) power technology but under a rigorous inspection regime. Iran, on its part, is noncommittal towards Obama’s overtures and it has not agreed to Mohamed ElBaradei’s recent proposal to place a five-year moratorium on uranium enrichment. Should Iran nuclearize, it then spells a proliferation chain in the Gulf region, which could become another major challenge for the US.

As far as critiquing the Prague Speech is concerned, there is certain backtracking by Obama especially his remark that nuclear weapons elimination is not possible in his own life time. He has, in a way, thrown the towel even before entering the ring. He has also mentioned that nuclear weapons will remain with the US to ensure its safety through deterrence. That the US needs to continue indefinitely with the possession of nuclear weapons has been endorsed by three authorities in the US. The first is in a Council on Foreign Relations Report, headed by Brent Scowcroft, the second is a statement made by Robert Gates and the third is in a report by a Congressional commission. The only concession made by Obama in his Prague speech is that the US will not go in for any new weapons programme. On the positive side, steps have been taken to negotiate with Russia on START and there is the hope that by the middle of this year there might be an agreement to reduce nuclear weapons (strategic offensive nuclear weapons) to around 1500, which again is the most optimistic estimate.

One has to think through this conundrum of how exactly would the reduction of nuclear weapons by the US and Russia stimulate non-proliferation. One must also address more realistically the concerns that underlie the quest for nuclear weapons. Why do countries want nuclear weapons? Can that be assuaged by Russia and the US giving up their nuclear weapons?
stimulate non-proliferation. One must also address more realistically the concerns that underlie the quest for nuclear weapons. Why do countries want nuclear weapons? Can that be assuaged by Russia and the US giving up their nuclear weapons?

Article VI does not envisage laying down pre-conditions or time tables for reaching global zero, so it is very clear that the nuclear weapon states should move towards nuclear disarmament and not lay down pre-conditions. India’s policy, therefore, has to be two pronged. First, India should continue to urge the US and Russia to move credibly towards fulfilling their obligations in accordance with Article VI and eliminate their nuclear weapons. Second, India should set some kind of an example by signing the CTBT and ceasing efforts to acquire missile defence system. The third option, otherwise, is to match rhetoric with rhetoric, but do nothing at the end of the day.

Dr. G. Balachandran:

Obama’s speech in Prague is an effort to start something new so that the 2010 RevCon does not fail, because if it does, it will be a major setback to all other efforts that the US is taking towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Therefore, his speech sets out certain minimum conditions towards the same; the obvious ones being CTBT ratification, restart of the START negotiations and the FMCT.

First, as far as the CTBT is concerned, this is the best chance for the US has to ratify the treaty; which needs 67 votes in the Senate and they have 60 votes already. The administration requires 7 votes out of the 40 republicans in Senate; 22 of them voted against and the one republican who voted for the treaty last time is still part of the current Senate. So there are 18 new senators who did not vote the last time, out of 22 who voted against, two (McCain and Lugar) have since then indicated that they will reconsider their decision and both of them are influential. Therefore, they need 5 votes out of the 18 members, assuming all the other 20 old guards would still vote against the ratification. Second, the START negotiations will make substantial progress by next year and by the time the NPT 2010 RevCon kick starts, negotiations for START would have gone to a stage where the nuclear weapon states can say that they are working towards Article VI, which they have been saying all the time.

It is pointless and futile to talk about nuclear disarmament. Unless there is an absolute guarantee to the US and other nuclear weapon states that the likelihood of any state indulging in nuclear activities in a clandestine manner is completely controlled, there will be no nuclear disarmament. Obama’s point about strengthening the NPT is more a question of strengthening the IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol (AP), which at present, is not required under the NPT. NSG members have been trying to push the AP at the NSG, but Brazil has refused to sign it.

What about the FMCT? The IAEA currently certifies that no nuclear material under safeguards is diverted anywhere and it has certified about 58 countries so far, where it says that these countries have not only have not diverted their nuclear material but they do not have any nuclear programme within their country that is not peaceful. However, some of these countries are not consequential such as Japan and South Korea which have been certified as countries not having any nuclear programme that is not peaceful. Therefore, unless the IAEA, and not the US, can get to a stage when it can certify that a substantial majority of non-nuclear weapons states which are party to the NPT, do not have any facilities in the country that are non-nuclear, nuclear disarmament will not be possible.

Regarding FMCT and India: There are reports that Pakistan is building two plutonium reactors. One is 140 megawatts thermal and there is no information on the second. On the other hand, India’s un-safeguarded reactor capacity is about 7200 megawatt thermal. The un-safeguarded plutonium that India has today is way above anybody else in the world. Not all of it is weapons grade; nevertheless, at the height of the Cold War in the mid-1960s, the capacity of the Hanford site, which was a major plutonium reactor facility in the US, was 7000 megawatt thermal. In two years, if India
uses its 7000 megawatt capacity un-safeguarded reactors, there will be so much plutonium that one will not know what to do with it. Therefore, FMCT is not going to be a problem for India because the problem is not about producing plutonium. However, weapons grade plutonium when produced in a reactor has to be reprocessed and India’s reprocessing capacity is inadequate, and this is of concern. One cannot have reprocessing capacity fulfilling requirements for both the breeder reactor and the weapons programme. So there is no problem in producing fissile material and there is some indication that in the last three years of India building its weapons grade fissile material stocks. Therefore, the concern is not the lack of fissile material; rather it is the question of what to do with it.

The CTBT is a different matter and it will be ratified by the US Senate followed by China before the 2010 NPT RevCon. There will be a lot of pressure on India to sign the CTBT. India, therefore, has to decide whether or not it wants to sign the treaty or if there is any other option that is exercisable. At present, there is a certain ambivalence in India regarding this.

Finally, the IAEA has to be strengthened, Additional Protocol has to be made compulsory, which should not be of concern to India, since it has already negotiated an AP, and the FMCT is also not a problem; however, it should be verifiable. Withdrawal from the NPT is of no concern to India and the US and others should stop pursuing India to sign the NPT for it can only sign the NPT as a nuclear weapon state.

Discussion

Comments

• There is a marginal chance that the US senate will ratify the CTBT due to Obama’s popularity, which may result from his having the political and social capital to influence the views of decision-makers.
• The possibility of eliminating nuclear weapons is extremely small and therefore no President can say that this is going to happen in the near future. The process will occur in stages that cannot be rushed or bypassed.
• What is clear is that the new nuclear weaponry has a much longer shelf life than previous bombs and warheads.
• The de-legitimization debate is being overlooked, not just in this forum; it has lost popularity in general and significant support. However, the argument about the legitimate use of nuclear weapons might provide a framework to address the arguments for nuclear weapons elimination.
• The ratification of the CTBT is a different issue from that of the FMCT. India needs to clearly articulate its position in relation to this treaty; it needs to be very clear whether it if for or against it.
• There is a general feeling that the CTBT and the FMCT are steps towards disarmament. In reality, the US ratifying the CTBT will not make an enormous amount of difference for this goal of disarmament. It is likely that the US will ratify the treaty.
• Obama’s statement that nuclear disarmament will not occur in his lifetime is seen as a sign of weakness and backtracking. On the contrary, it was not backtracking, but realism. There is perhaps a conflict between ‘Obama the man’ and ‘Obama the President.’ Realistically, he is constrained by factors inherent in the position that he holds and he therefore does not have the freedom to do whatever he wants, whenever he chooses. Besides, total disarmament would require a significant change of mindset that will not happen quickly, regardless of how much Obama and others might wish it.
• The proposed 2010 NPT RevCon may well be just a forum to showcase initiatives taken by, and the good behaviour of, the nuclear weapon states and their allies (such as Japan and Australia). It may also be a tool that will be used to ‘sweeten’ the perceptions of
those states that will be, and are permitted to have, reprocessing facilities.

• Now is possibly the time when there is the best chance that the US will ratify the CTBT due to the Obama administration and the significant goodwill it has.

• India does not need to become defensive when it is criticized for refusing to sign the NPT. This is criticism that has been occurring for a long time and India needs to be confident of its position. The statements against India are made for a certain audience and to promote a sense of unity among the signatories of the NPT.

• Relations with the Obama administration are still very formal and India needs to understand that it is now talking to a Democratic administration, so things have changed. The change in administration may allow for a different direction to the dialogue and a new context.

• There is a new India out there that has moved on from where Clinton left off, and from where the Bush administration departed. There is also a new US. India has, therefore, every reason to be confident of its position and actions.

• India should be particularly concerned about WMDs given its close proximity to Pakistan; it exists in a very uncertain geopolitical environment. It needs to push this issue with the US and make its concerns on this issue known. By doing this it may open a new basis for discussion on nuclear weapons with the US.

• Pakistan says that its nuclear weapons are secure because they are dispersed throughout the country, but given that 30 per cent of the country is under Taliban control at present, the question must be asked as to where specifically these weapons are.

• There is a problem because India does not have a clearly articulated nuclear position and it tends to react to statements made by outside actors. This is important because it means that key strategic issues are being overlooked in favour of a reactionary stance.

• It is not prudent to decrease India’s nuclear arsenal given its highly volatile location.

Questions

• Japan welcomed Obama’s speech as it provided the country new aspirations regarding nuclear disarmament. The recently released statement on Japan’s nuclear disarmament policies used the scope of Obama’s speech. There are two questions that this conference and others like it raise:

  It is often asked by Indian strategic thinkers: Will Japan go nuclear? Why is this so relevant, or of so much interest to Indian strategic thinkers? Japan has made the strategic decision to forgo nuclear weapons in favour of the US nuclear umbrella at the time it signed the NPT. There has been no change in its strategic environment since then that would warrant change.

  How is India addressing the NPT following the NSG deal? Does it still consider the NPT discriminatory or can it now address the nuclear issue from a different angle?

• The CTBT might be more realistic if it was clearer what the current situation was with regard to computer simulation. Does this issue affect whether India would sign the CTBT?

• Is China the key factor in India’s nuclear policy? What does this mean?

• Considering it is about to be reviewed, and in the light of Obama’s speech, should India take a renewed formally articulated stance against the NPT? What should the official government approach be at this time?

Responses

• Japanese scholars have said that the constitution of Japan does not prevent it from going nuclear. This is why there is concern.

• The NSG deal does not change India’s way of looking at the NPT. It will not initiate any new
reaction, or actions vis-a-vis the treaty. The NPT remains a crumbling institution, a collapsing treaty: Why would India join it?

- There certainly has been progress made on computer simulations and the technology is there; however, the extent to which it would influence India’s decision to sign the CTBT is highly debatable. It is also unclear what is the degree of progress made with computer simulations.
- India has had experience with Democratic administrations before and the Obama administration is not terribly different from its predecessors.
- China is a key factor but China and Pakistan are seen as unequivocally linked, almost as one entity, and therefore there is more influencing India’s nuclear policy than just China.
- It is unlikely that India will say anything further regarding the NPT; the world is already familiar with its position. Regarding the official stance, they must realise that Obama is a Democrat and as such represents a Democratic administration. It might be useful to look back at the way India interacted with Clinton to understand his position better.
I've learned over many years to appreciate the good company and the good humor of the Czech people in my hometown of Chicago. Behind me is a statue of a hero of the Czech people - Tomas Masaryk. In 1918, after America had pledged its support for Czech independence, Masaryk spoke to a crowd in Chicago that was estimated to be over 100,000. I don't think I can match his record - but I am honored to follow his footsteps from Chicago to Prague.

For over a thousand years, Prague has set itself apart from any other city in any other place. You've known war and peace. You've seen empires rise and fall. You've led revolutions in the arts and science, in politics and in poetry. Through it all, the people of Prague have insisted on pursuing their own path, and defining their own destiny. And this city - this Golden City which is both ancient and youthful - stands as a living monument to your unconquerable spirit.

When I was born, the world was divided, and our nations were faced with very different circumstances. Few people would have predicted that someone like me would one day become the President of the United States. Few people would have predicted that an American President would one day be permitted to speak to an audience like this in Prague. Few would have imagined that the Czech Republic would become a free nation, a member of NATO, a leader of a united Europe. Those ideas would have been dismissed as dreams.

We are here today because enough people ignored the voices who told them that the world could not change.

We're here today because of the courage of those who stood up and took risks to say that freedom is a right for all people, no matter what side of a wall they live on, and no matter what they look like.

We are here today because of the Prague Spring - because the simple and principled pursuit of liberty and opportunity shamed those who relied on the power of tanks and arms to put down the will of a people.

We are here today because 20 years ago, the people of this city took to the streets to claim the promise of a new day, and the fundamental human rights that had been denied them for far too long. Sametová Revoluce - the Velvet Revolution - taught us many things. It showed us that peaceful protest could shake the foundations of an empire, and expose the emptiness of an ideology. It showed us that small countries can play a pivotal role in world events, and that young people can lead the way in overcoming old conflicts. And it proved that moral leadership is more powerful than any weapon.

That's why I'm speaking to you in the center of a Europe that is peaceful, united and free - because ordinary people believed that divisions could be bridged, even when their leaders did not. They believed that walls could come down; that peace could prevail.

We are here today because Americans and Czechs believed against all odds that today could be possible.

Now, we share this common history. But now this generation - our generation - cannot stand still. We, too, have a choice to make. As the world has become less divided, it has become more interconnected. And we've seen events move faster than our ability to control them - a global economy in crisis, a changing climate, the persistent dangers of old conflicts, new threats and the spread of catastrophic weapons.

None of these challenges can be solved quickly or easily. But all of them demand that we listen to one another and work together; that we focus on our common interests, not on occasional differences; and that we reaffirm our shared values, which are stronger than any force that could drive us apart. That is the work that we must carry on. That is the work that I have come to Europe to begin.

To renew our prosperity, we need action coordinated across borders. That means investments to create new jobs. That means resisting the walls of protectionism that stand in the way of growth. That means a change in our financial system, with new rules to prevent abuse and future crisis.

And we have an obligation to our common prosperity and our common humanity to extend a hand to those emerging markets and impoverished people who are
suffering the most, even though they may have had
very little to do with financial crises, which is why we
set aside over a trillion dollars for the International
Monetary Fund earlier this week, to make sure that
everybody - everybody - receives some assistance.

Now, to protect our planet, now is the time to change
the way that we use energy. Together, we must
confront climate change by ending the world's
dependence on fossil fuels, by tapping the power of
new sources of energy like the wind and sun, and
calling upon all nations to do their part. And I pledge
to you that in this global effort, the United States is
now ready to lead.

To provide for our common security, we must
strengthen our alliance. NATO was founded 60 years
ago, after Communism took over Czechoslovakia.
That was when the free world learned too late that it
could not afford division. So we came together to
forge the strongest alliance that the world has ever
known. And we stood shoulder to shoulder - year
after year, decade after decade - until an Iron Curtain
was lifted, and freedom spread like flowing water.

This marks the 10th year of NATO membership for
the Czech Republic. And I know that many times in
the 20th century, decisions were made without you at
the table. Great powers let you down, or determined
your destiny without your voice being heard. I am
here to say that the United States will never turn its
back on the people of this nation. We are bound by
shared values, shared history, and the enduring
promise of our alliance. NATO's Article V states it
clearly: An attack on one is an attack on all. That is a
promise for our time, and for all time.

The people of the Czech Republic kept that promise
after America was attacked; thousands were killed on
our soil, and NATO responded. NATO's mission in
Afghanistan is fundamental to the safety of people on
both sides of the Atlantic. We are targeting the same
Al Qaeda terrorists who have struck from New York
to London, and helping the Afghan people take
Aviv, Paris or Prague - could kill hundreds of
thousands of people. And no matter where it happens,
there is no end to what the consequences might be - for
our global safety, our security, our society, our
economy, to our ultimate survival.

Now, one of those issues that I'll focus on today is
fundamental to the security of our nations and to the
peace of the world - that's the future of nuclear
weapons in the 21st century.

The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the
most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. No nuclear
war was fought between the United States and the
Soviet Union, but generations lived with the
knowledge that their world could be erased in a single
flash of light. Cities like Prague that existed for
centuries, that embodied the beauty and the talent of
so much of humanity, would have ceased to exist.

Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of
those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history,
the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the
risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have
acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black
markets trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials.
The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists
are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts
to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-
proliferation regime, but as more people and nations
break the rules, we could reach the point where the
center cannot hold.

Now, understand, this matters to people everywhere.
One nuclear weapon exploded in one city - be it New
York or Moscow, Islamabad or Mumbai, Tokyo or Tel
Aviv, Paris or Prague - could kill hundreds of
thousands of people. And no matter where it happens,
there is no end to what the consequences might be - for
our global safety, our security, our society, our
economy, to our ultimate survival.

Some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot
be stopped, cannot be checked - that we are destined to
live in a world where more nations and more people
possess the ultimate tools of destruction. Such fatalism
is a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread
of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we
are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear
weapons is inevitable.

Just as we stood for freedom in the 20th century, we
must stand together for the right of people everywhere
to live free from fear in the 21st century. And as a
nuclear power - as the only nuclear power to have used
a nuclear weapon - the United States has a moral
responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this
endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.

So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's
commitment to seek the peace and security of a world
without nuclear weapons. I'm not naive. This goal will
not be reached quickly - perhaps not in my lifetime. It
will take patience and persistence. But now we, too,
must ignore the voices who tell us that the world
cannot change. We have to insist, "Yes, we can."
Now, let me describe to you the trajectory we need to be on. First, the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies - including the Czech Republic. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.

To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians this year. President Medvedev and I began this process in London, and will seek a new agreement by the end of this year that is legally binding and sufficiently bold. And this will set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor.

To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned.

And to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, the United States will seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons. If we are serious about stopping the spread of these weapons, then we should put an end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade materials that create them. That's the first step.

Second, together we will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation.

The basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy. To strengthen the treaty, we should embrace several principles. We need more resources and authority to strengthen international inspections. We need real and immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause.

And we should build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation. That must be the right of every nation that renounces nuclear weapons, especially developing countries embarking on peaceful programs. And no approach will succeed if it’s based on the denial of rights to nations that play by the rules. We must harness the power of nuclear energy on behalf of our efforts to combat climate change, and to advance opportunity for all people.

But we go forward with no illusions. Some countries will break the rules. That’s why we need a structure in place that ensures when any nation does, they will face consequences.

Just this morning, we were reminded again of why we need a new and more rigorous approach to address this threat. North Korea broke the rules once again by testing a rocket that could be used for long range missiles. This provocation underscores the need for action - not just this afternoon at the U.N. Security Council, but in our determination to prevent the spread of these weapons.

Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons. Now is the time for a strong international response, and North Korea must know that the path to security and respect will never come through threats and illegal weapons. All nations must come together to build a stronger, global regime. And that’s why we must stand shoulder to shoulder to pressure the North Koreans to change course.

Iran has yet to build a nuclear weapon. My administration will seek engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect. We believe in dialogue. But in that dialogue we will present a clear choice. We want Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations, politically and economically. We will support Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy with rigorous inspections. That's a path that the Islamic Republic can take. Or the government can choose increased isolation, international pressure, and a potential nuclear arms race in the region that will increase insecurity for all.

So let me be clear: Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile activity poses a real threat, not just to the United States, but to Iran’s neighbors and our allies. The Czech Republic and Poland have been courageous in agreeing to host a defense against these missiles. As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed.

So, finally, we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across
the globe. To protect our people, we must act with a sense of purpose without delay.

So today I am announcing a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. We will set new standards, expand our cooperation with Russia, pursue new partnerships to lock down these sensitive materials.

We must also build on our efforts to break up black markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt this dangerous trade. Because this threat will be lasting, we should come together to turn efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable international institutions. And we should start by having a Global Summit on Nuclear Security that the United States will host within the next year.

Now, I know that there are some who will question whether we can act on such a broad agenda. There are those who doubt whether true international cooperation is possible, given inevitable differences among nations. And there are those who hear talk of a world without nuclear weapons and doubt whether it's worth setting a goal that seems impossible to achieve.

But make no mistake: We know where that road leads. When nations and peoples allow themselves to be defined by their differences, the gulf between them widens. When we fail to pursue peace, then it stays forever beyond our grasp. We know the path when we choose fear over hope. To denounce or shrug off a call for cooperation is an easy but also a cowardly thing to do. That's how wars begin. That's where human progress ends.

There is violence and injustice in our world that must be confronted. We must confront it not by splitting apart but by standing together as free nations, as free people. I know that a call to arms can stir the souls of men and women more than a call to lay them down. But that is why the voices for peace and progress must be raised together.

Those are the voices that still echo through the streets of Prague. Those are the ghosts of 1968. Those were the joyful sounds of the Velvet Revolution. Those were the Czechs who helped bring down a nuclear-armed empire without firing a shot.

Human destiny will be what we make of it. And here in Prague, let us honor our past by reaching for a better future. Let us bridge our divisions, build upon our hopes, accept our responsibility to leave this world more prosperous and more peaceful than we found it. Together we can do it.

Thank you very much. Thank you, Prague.

(Source: The Acronym Institute)
Within the first hundred days in office, US President Barack Obama has attempted to address a series of problems, both national and global. After trying to set in place a process to deal with the meltdown of the US economy, he announced his ‘Af-Pak’ policy, attempted to shore up US relations with Europe and Russia, and announced his administration’s ‘new’ approach to the challenge of a world without nuclear weapons in the context of the forthcoming Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be held in 2010.

On 5 April, speaking to a large crowd in Prague, Czech Republic, Obama stated, “clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” While emphasizing this commitment, he added, “To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same.” These commitments are indeed new.

However, almost in the same breath, he made a second commitment, “as long as these weapons exist we will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee the defence of our allies.”

This dual commitment could very well be an indicator of the difficulties ahead; rumblings have already been heard from that staunch supporter of nuclear disarmament, Japan, as it faces the uncertain prospect of a world without a nuclear security umbrella. On the other hand, more uncharitably, the dual commitments could very well be the window-dressing on the agreement already reached with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, to reduce bilaterally, the huge weapon arsenals which have begun to be a burden on the economies of both countries.

This would dilute the strength of the first commitment, but would be a gesture towards the Review Conference on 2010. It will be recalled that the last Review Conference in 2005 collapsed on the issue of no movement by the NPT nuclear weapon powers towards disarmament. Yet President Obama also referred to “further cuts,” in which process the US will seek to include other nuclear weapon States. It would appear that he is seeking to put a process of actual disarmament in place.

On the whole, however, Obama has been more specific on non-proliferation actions from the ‘old’ agenda: the CTBT, a verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and the NPT. Whether he would be able to rally enough support in the US Senate to pass the CTBT remains moot; there is disagreement on an unqualified ratification even within his own administration. The entry into force of the CTBT could, however, put a brake on countries like Iran which might be contemplating weaponization, and might be sold as such to reluctant Republican Senators. Obama is clearly of the view that the NPT needs to be strengthened - by stronger inspections, by “punishment” for non-compliance and a “new framework for civil nuclear cooperation.”

Even on nuclear terrorism, which he called “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security,” his concrete proposals relate to Bush-era initiatives, the PSI and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. As an indication of the priority his administration will give to non-proliferation issues, he has proposed a Global Summit on Nuclear Security to be held in the US “within the next year.”

It has been reported that President Obama has set up a task force on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation which is to submit its report by the end of the year. His speech, therefore, only outlines the broad parameters of his administration’s approach; details will only be available perhaps at the 2010 Conference. While the emphasis on nuclear disarmament would be welcomed, the reiteration of the earlier Democratic stands on non-proliferation could presage trouble ahead.

The approach is a punitive one, with the US-led Nuclear Weapon States and their followers insisting on action on specific countries which might, in their view, have the intention of developing a nuclear arsenal. Consultation and dialogue are not seen as options. Whether this approach has been successful in the past, can be determined with the record so far, as the NPT itself crumbles. The important element in the speech was the careful balancing of the imperatives of disarmament with those of non-proliferation, and the emphasis on the responsibilities of countries with nuclear weapons, especially the US, to take concrete action to meet their obligations.

As a political stand, it is almost impeccable; it remains to be seen whether, given opposition in the US itself, actions will go further than the rhetoric.
US President Barack Obama’s call for nuclear disarmament earlier this month in Prague may appear to be a radical message; however, a closer examination suggests that his soaring rhetoric hides somewhat baser – and narrow – national interest. Nevertheless, Obama’s message is also a foretaste of what Indian diplomacy will have to deal with in the coming year.

Obama’s speech itself is the culmination of an increasing emphasis in Washington on nuclear disarmament. What is notable about this new-found concern is that much of it piggybacks on concerns about nuclear proliferation and potential nuclear terrorism. All these recent arguments, are notable for their concern about the possibility that proliferation might make the US more vulnerable to a nuclear attack from terrorists or from rogue third world dictators. There is nothing necessarily wrong with security concerns driving nuclear disarmament. Rather it raises the suspicion that if American security concerns are addressed, through a rejuvenated NPT, then nuclear disarmament will once again be consigned to left-wing academic conferences.

Obama’s speech was more along traditional American lines. The primary driver is still the concern with nuclear proliferation. It appears more as a public relations campaign aimed at rebuilding the non-proliferation regime and specifically aimed at burnishing American credentials in time for the NPT Review Conference next year. The RevCon is likely to be stormy, and Obama wants to improve the American image.

The US President reiterated American commitment to ballistic missile defense (though with some caveats about technical feasibility), to the NATO, CTBT and FMCT. He has also promised a new push towards deeper cuts in the US and Russian nuclear weapons through a new START agreement. On CTBT, Obama promises to seek Senate ratification (a tall order considering that he needs nine Republican votes for the two-thirds majority needed), and on FMCT he has junked the Bush administration’s ‘no verification’ approach.

Moscow has been cautious in its response, as it faces both opportunities and difficulties. The opportunities lie in the promise of a new arms control treaty that might lead to significant reductions in both arsenals, something that Russia has been seeking because it cannot afford to keep the bloated ‘legacy’ arsenal. Russia is also hoping for a more traditional nuclear arms control treaty to replace the Moscow Treaty, which counted only warheads (not delivery systems), left unaccounted huge numbers of ‘reserve’ warheads, and had no verification clauses. The Russians have already declared that they would seek to count delivery systems in any new treaty and seek control on nuclear weapons in space. The US and Russia have already begun preliminary discussions on a new nuclear arms control treaty that would reduce strategic nuclear weapons to much lower levels, possibly as low as one thousand each.

In terms of challenges, as Russian nuclear arms dwindled, Moscow has been placing greater emphasis on its nuclear deterrent because its conventional forces have deteriorated faster. Hence, a reduction in nuclear arsenals, though necessary, is still worrying because it highlights even more starkly its weakened conventional power. So Moscow has also been seeking conventional arms control to match the reductions taking place in the nuclear arena. However, the US is unlikely to satisfy Russian concerns on this issue because it intends to maintain a global role that would be impossible without its significant conventional military clout. Russia has a painful choice to make: it cannot afford its huge nuclear arsenal, but cannot afford to significantly reduce its nuclear arsenal without some agreements on conventional arms, either.

Where does this new nuclear arms control push leave New Delhi? India is likely to welcome any reduction in the US/Russia strategic arsenals, but the other parts of the Obama agenda do create some concerns. If Obama is able to convince the US Senate to ratify the CTBT, India will be under pressure to join the global momentum towards CTBT. The instinctive Indian reaction has been to link any Indian acceptance of the CTBT to progress in global nuclear disarmament. It might be wise for New Delhi to reconsider this stance. There is little indication that India needs to test again and the CTBT will have little impact on India’s nuclear arsenal or its weapons status.

Standing alone against the CTBT made sense in 1996; today it would suggest stasis. Besides, India has bigger battles ahead. If the FMCT negotiations begin, then India needs to find partners to work with to ensure that its existing fissile material stocks are not touched. India also needs to ensure that progress in US-Russian strategic arms control does not lead to demands that India also join the process soon.

India also needs to resist the latest fad – linking regional nuclear issues with conventional military balances and regional conflicts, being promoted by Pakistan, China and some Middle Eastern states. Advancing India’s arms control agenda on all of these issues will be easier without an unnecessary CTBT diversion.