Nuclear Weapons and Regional Security
Reintroducing the Disarmament Debate in South Asia

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Organized by
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS)
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The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies along with the Stella Maris College, Chennai organized a one day workshop on 6 September 2008, on nuclear disarmament and regional security. The Workshop focused on the following four themes: Nuclear Weapons in South Asia and Regional Security, Safety and Security of Nuclear Weapons, Indo-US Nuclear Deal and Global Nuclear Disarmament. Students from leading colleges in Chennai and the Madras University, along with young scholars from institutes, think-tanks and media in Chennai took part in this Workshop and made presentations.

The primary objective of the workshop is to address the contemporary challenges in disarmament and reintroduce the debate among young scholars on global and regional nuclear issues. This workshop is a part of series, which the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) has been organizing along with Universities/Colleges/Think-tanks at national and regional levels. The first workshop was organized in New Delhi on 19-21 August 2008. These workshops aim to debate the possibility of a world free of nuclear weapons and build a more informed younger community of scholars.

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) was established in August 1996 as an independent think tank devoted to studying security issues relating to South Asia. Over the years leading strategic thinkers, academicians, former members of the Civil Services, Foreign Services, Armed Forces, Police Forces, Paramilitary Forces and media persons (print and electronic) have been associated with the Institute in its endeavour to chalk out a comprehensive framework for security studies - one which can cater to the changing demands of national, regional and global security. The Executive Committee reflects this essential mix of experience and expertise.

The Institute maintains close liaison with the Indian Ministries of Defence and External Affairs and provides ample scope for alternative views and approaches by hosting a wide range of opinion articles on its interactive website, with the aim of bringing out the areas of convergence and divergence in the thought processes of policy planners and executors and the final benefactors - the people.

The Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai was started in 2002. It endeavours to provide young women with the knowledge and skills required for studying international affairs that would lead them to challenging and rewarding careers in research organizations, government and non-governmental organizations. The programme adopts a liberal perspective combined with research and analytical tools to understand the complexities of the political, cultural, economic and social forces that shape international affairs. The curriculum is designed to include both practical and theoretical components and includes workshops, foreign language courses and area studies. This is the first programme of its kind under the aegis of the University of Madras.

In its efforts to forge long term national and international collaborations with Universities and research institutions, the department has entered into Memoranda of Understanding with Institut Catholique d’Etudes Supérieures, Nantes, France and Institute Of Social Sciences, New Delhi.
Nuclear Disarmament and Regional Security

Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee

Director, IPCS

Do nuclear weapons contribute to regional security or are they the cause of insecurity in a region with the added risk of a possible nuclear exchange? The Kargil conflict, following soon after the nuclear tests the previous year, tested the situation intensely and demolished the idea that nuclear weapons deterred conventional conflict. So, does deterrence actually work in South Asia? It cannot be proved conclusively either way. If this was not alarming enough, the possibility that some nuclear weapons may actually fall in to the hands of terrorists challenges the very notion of deterrence. How does one deter someone bent on killing himself and who is not accountable to any one that can be deterred?

This was the essence of a workshop the IPCS organized in collaboration with the Stella Maris College (Autonomous), Chennai in September 2008. Post graduate students selected from among leading colleges of Chennai presented papers and debated intensely over these themes. A lively debate took place over the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. While the advantages from the Deal were patent and obvious, major steps remained in its actualisation. As the debate was in progress, word came through from Vienna that the Deal had been cleared by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The final session was devoted to exploring the possibilities of a world without nuclear weapons. Participants concluded that this goal was both desirable and possible. Rajiv Gandhi’s proposal at the United Nations in 1988 of a nuclear free world was recalled. In June this year at Delhi, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made a similar call. The challenge is now to the civil society around the world to realize this goal.
South Asia in a Tinder-box?

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South Asia has already teetered on the brink of nuclear annihilation twice: First in 1999 in Kargil, followed by the India and Pakistan standoff during 2001-2002.

During the Kargil crisis, nuclear threats were exchanged 13 times in just 5 weeks. The rhetoric included that they won't hesitate to use “any weapon” ushered in the era of nuclear tyranny in South Asia.

The non-nuclear neighbors in South Asia watched utterly helpless, without any diplomatic, military, political or economic mussel to influence the choices of these regional giants. There are no multi-lateral agreements to ensure restraint. What can the non-nuclear neighbors do to safeguarding their people, when the nuclear bullies threaten to showcase their power?

Using military judgment to guess the targets and postulating that most but not all the weapons would be used, the US Defense Department estimated 9 million to 12 million deaths, and injuries ranging from 2 million to 7 million people, due to a nuclear clash in the region. Not included in the estimate were subsequent deaths caused by urban firestorms ignited by the heat of a nuclear exchange, or deaths from long-term radiation, or the disease and starvation expected to spread.

Pokhran took South Asia by surprise. Then the region watched aghast as Pakistan “replied”. While the world thoroughly reprimanded both countries for this, South Asian neighbors like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal issued “soft statements” – some even refusing to use the words “nuclear testing” and merely alluring to this ominous twist as “the latest developments” instead.

Our fear of antagonizing the Big Brothers made us grudgingly accept this hegemony, without a hum.

The nuclear race has distracted South Asia from its burning problem - poverty alleviation. Therefore, it has become a root cause of social discontent that gives rise to terrorism. The A.Q. Khan episode shows the real possibility of nukes becoming the new expensive toys of terrorism – more fireworks in an already flashy, volatile region – home to the LTTE, the Pakistani Taliban, Maoists, the naxalites and Kashmiri separatists. This has posed a severe threat to the national security of many sovereign
nations in region.

Therefore, nuclearization has failed to create regional stability and security. Deterrence has become a mere delusion due to inherent flaws in its theoretical construct. The security-insecurity paradox created as countries opt for military/nuclear security detracts from the efforts to find a sustainable solution through political dialog. Plus, one’s own minimum is linked to the opponents level of preparation, which makes the notion of a “stable minimum posture” a myth.

The need to sustain “a credible-second strike capacity” has helped evolve “survivability-enhancement practices” which includes high-alert deployment, launch-on-warning and constantly airborne bombs/missile carrying planes. This has lead to brinkmanship politics with the “use them or lose them” philosophy. Once nuclear weapons become tools of foreign policy, it is impossible to restrict the sphere of influence or the goals for which these “deterrent producing weapons” would be used, making them the new god’s of Realpolitik.

So what is the way forward? The civil society, media and policy makers in the South Asian region needs to take immediate action to push for the following policy reforms:

**Declaring a South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone**: The Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967 made Latin America nuclear free, with all the nuclear powers at the time agreeing to it. The Bangkok Treaty (1995) declared Southeast Asia nuclear free. This would ensure that nuclear powers do not transport nuclear material over non-nuclear states, deploy weapons other countries in the region or dump waste on territories belonging to non-nuclear neighbours.

**Non-deployment and non-induction of nuclear weapons**: Ensuring that nuclear warheads and bombs are not fitted into the delivery mechanism and refraining from training the military in nuclear warfare would takeout the nuclear option from the strategic defenses arsenal.

**Non – conversion of fissile material stocks**: Both the Indian and Pakistani governments have to adopt a transparent state policy of refraining from enriching material for weapons production to bolster their stockpiles.

**No further nuclear explosives testing**: A clear, firm commitment to testing explosives testing would help to build mutual confidence between neighbouring states.

**Dismantling the small arsenal**: Long term commitment towards disarmament should be underlined.

The nuclearisation of South Asia has not lead to security and stability as envisaged. The flawed deterrence argument, the opportunity cost of an exorbitantly expensive nuclear program in two countries grappling with inadequate literacy, health care etc and the potential for nuclear technology to fall into the hands of terrorists, who will not hesitate to take “suicidal annihilation” to the next level, has created a perpetual sense of volatility and insecurity in the region.

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Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia

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It’s almost 10 years since India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, heralding them into the nuclear elite. Concerns however remain whether these nations are responsible enough to have nuclear weapons and whether they can ensure stability in South Asia, considering that it is one of the most volatile regions after the Middle East. Can nuclear deterrence actually be practiced in this region?

Ever since independence both India and Pakistan have pursued efforts to attain nuclear capability. Both countries have almost simultaneously achieved nuclear weapons capability, although according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987. The day of reckoning came in 1998, when both countries exploded nuclear devices. Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is essentially India centric. Its primary objective in achieving nuclear capability was to negate India’s conventional superiority over it. Other motives can be listed as power, prestige and primacy among Islamic states. However, these as the causes to achieve nuclear capability are flawed in argument.

Pakistan does not believe in no-first-use doctrine. Former President Pervez Musharraf made it clear in statements during May 2002. According to a FAS note, he has been quoted stating that he did not want a conflict with India. However, if there was a war between India and Pakistan, he would "respond with full might." The same note also observed that these statements "were interpreted to mean that if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack from India, which has superior conventional forces, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons." Thus, nuclear weapons have given Pakistan confidence to deal with India on equal terms. It uses nuclear deterrence as a shield to weaken India through proxy war. India’s nuclear doctrine, on the other hand is based on No-first-use. This also means assured retaliation of "unacceptable damage" against any state that is involved in a nuclear warfare; hence, India follows a counter-strike doctrine where nuclear weapons are a deterrent to the use of nuclear weapons and conventional forces are deterred with conventional forces. It also states that universal nuclear disarmament is in India’s security interest (which in turn provides scope for conventional superiority over Pakistan and China at lesser cost and complexity), and its long term plan is to envisage a global nuclear disarmament. This is basically the crux of both Indian and Pakistan’s doctrine.

We shall now deal with nuclear deterrence in detail and its various aspects. The effective operation of deterrence over the long term requires that the other party be willing to live with our possession of the capability upon which it rests. Observers argue that nuclear deterrence is nearly automatic: the mere presence of nuclear forces in a conflict prone region creates a situation of such obvious danger that neither side to a dispute would dare threaten the vital interests of other. Others argue that nuclear deterrence is a delicate condition, the achievement of which requires thoughtful defence
planning, clear communication of interests, adroit handling of crises and a little luck. As Lavoy says, "stability of any relation of nuclear deterrence ...rests on the willingness and ability of concerned states to understand the responsibilities of nuclear ownership."

Whatever may be the case, it is accepted that nuclear deterrence is in the vital interest of both the nations. Both countries have been working to settle and resolve issues. Confidence building measures such as advance notice of ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing have shown signs of progress in the region.

The question that remains to be answered is as to how nuclear deterrence has helped? To an extent, it can be said that with the advent of nuclear weapon states in the region, the situation has become more complex. The possession of nuclear capabilities by India and Pakistan creates a situation where serious political crises, heated religious and ethnic tensions and frequent border clashes do not escalate to full scale warfare. This provides a greater level of stabilisation in the region. The acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities in the region have also at the same time produced a variant of Glenn Snyder's 'stability/instability paradox', where stability induced by nuclear weapons through mutual deterrence at the strategic level opens up the possibility of more frequent resort to force, and hence increased instability, at lower levels of violence. This has created...a perceived mutual deterrence that might have influenced the prolonged proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir and disabled India from using its assumed conventional military superiority over the last ten years."

The result of nuclear deterrence therefore has been the following: both countries can only engage themselves in limited warfare, with limited political and strategic objectives. Conflict between states has been reduced to a conventional (low intensity) war. Hence, nuclear deterrence to a marked extent works in attaining a mid term stability in the region. We can deduce three areas in which Indo-Pakistani cooperation has become necessary; each state must accept that military victory over the other is impossible; neither side must attempt to use the fear of nuclear war as a lever to change the territorial and political status quo; and both the countries should avoid initiating or escalating bilateral crises, especially those that could escalate to military and potentially nuclear conflict. Somewhat more controversial is a fourth implication – the need for arms control to stabilize deterrence, to provide reassurance that each side grasps the need to cooperate to avoid nuclear war. Bernard Brodie viewed this imperative as 'the need to limit or control the unsettling effects of our deterrent posture'.

We must find a solution with accepting the fact that nuclear weapons cannot be phased out from the region. Countries like India and Pakistan need to work together to ensure that nuclear proliferation is kept to a minimum and a greater understanding exists between countries so as to avoid situations spiralling into unmanageable proportions. Poor command, control and intelligence in the region could well contribute to a spiral of misperception and inadvertent escalation. Nuclear weapons as deterrence, work to a marked extent work in providing regional stability and help nations in the region to pursue a co-operative and realistic process for co-existence.
Stephen P. Cohen once stated, “Nuclearization of South Asia had been predicted for decades, yet, when it came, it came as a surprise”. This more or less summarizes the reaction of the other nations in the region and also the international community as a whole, when India and Pakistan went ahead with their respective nuclear tests. It’s going to be a decade and yet nuclearization of South Asia, symbolized by the set of ever volatile neighbors, India and Pakistan is considered to be a touch and go issue. With the recent escalation in border tension and the civil nuclear deal in the pipeline, which may or may not come through, due to the recent revelations between India and the US, South Asia is definitely attracting a lot of attention!

India went ahead with the nuclear tests, primarily because of three reasons, to begin with to deter the growing threat from China and Pakistan, not to mention the aspiration of attaining an international status and what seems to be the most overriding reason, domestic compulsions. The Vajpayee led BJP government had a lot at stake and they definitely looked at going nuclear as an arrival of sorts of India onto the international arena. For Pakistan, it has been an absolute blatant acceptance that building a deterrent capability vis-à-vis India, was the prime motivator for the Pakistani programs and testing.

In the present anarchic world order, where realism is the theory to reckon with, nuclearization of South Asia may seem to be a fairly placed deal, given that the largest two countries of the region possess nuclear weapons. But what makes it a cyclic and sensitive issue is the series of complexities attached to these two nations. Contrary to beliefs, the nuclearization of the region hasn’t led to deterrence but in turn has resulted in the stability-instability paradox.

Instead of containing low intensity conflicts, it has fuelled low on violence conflicts, exemplified by the Kargil as well as the 2002 face off between India and Pakistan. The Chinese angle also makes it quite complex. On one hand, China wants to project itself as an international power (it has all the reasons to do so) but regionally it perceives India as a threat, given the border disputes between the two nations. That probably explains the strategic and military support it provides to Pakistan, following the policy of appeasement.

The asymmetry existing between the nuclear doctrines of two nations makes the establishment of deterrence stability extremely difficult to achieve. India believes in proving and projecting itself as a responsible nuclear power and hence emphasizes on the concepts of credible minimum deterrence and ‘no first use’ policy, whereas Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine remains to be the most ambiguous of all.
with no mention of ‘no first use’ and neither that of credible minimum deterrence. Credibility clearly is
not a word Pakistan associates itself with. Given the case of proliferation by A.Q.Khan and the transfer
of nuclear know how from China, India’s apprehension to get down to the negotiating table, is certainly
justified.

What this apprehension is leading to is an unstable deterrent condition in the ever so volatile region
of South Asia. Many believe that the deterrence theory doesn’t hold good for the region. This
statement may be classified as partial truth. Deterrence as a concept might hold relevance but what
we need to understand is that the model of the classical deterrence theory applicable in the cold war
era is not compatible to the South Asian region to the complete contrast in the geo
strategic environment. Hence the concept of deterrence needs to be adapted to the
South Asian context. This can be done by a shared realization that both the sides are
nuclear capable and that the reaction time and hence the devastation is going to be
humongous.

Though deterrence stability doesn’t exist at the moment, it can definitely be brought
about by analyzing what’s missing and what needs to be done. This could also be done
by bringing in a certain degree of transparency between the intention and the
capability. Intention, here, mentions about the political will and how the polity of one
nation perceives the other and capability, implies the nuclear arsenals one owns. We
need to realize that the existing CBMs aren’t exactly working and hence they need to
be revamped and emphasized upon. The basis of this would be to accept each other as responsible
nuclear power, which will help in creating a sense of trust. For this, Pakistan really needs to put forth
its nuclear doctrine in clear terms, which would lessen the Indian apprehension of its neighbor’s
stance.

Both the nations need to emphasize on deterrence stability as it will also address the problem of
accidental or unauthorized use that may come from dispersion or delegation of authority to use
the arsenal. Both countries need to understand how each understands the other.

The region of South Asia is extremely asymmetric in terms of socio-political structure
and the existing territorial as well as ethnic issues don’t make it any better. Nuclearization of
South Asia is looked upon with this amount of apprehension due to the geographical expanse
and the rapid economic development of India.

making it a presumed hegemonic power in the region.

For India to break this notion and maintain congenial relations with the rest of the world, Pakistan and
China included, is the need of the hour. Whereas for Pakistan, it has never really abided by the norms,
and now courtesy the Chinese support and partnership with US in the “fight against terror” and not to
forget the domestic political turmoil, it is now to been how and who accounts for the Pakistani
actions.

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II. SAFETY & SECURITY OF NUCLEAR ASSETS

Safeguarding Nuclear Assets: India & Pakistan

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The entirety of the nuclear age has been dominated by debates about whether the destructive weapons are a force of stability or a source of danger. Today, the primary focus is, and ought to be, about the ability of new nuclear states to adequately safeguard and secure their nuclear deterrents—an aftermath of the AQ Khan nuclear supplier network which constituted the most severe loss of state control over nuclear technology ever.

C2 or Command and Control is a concept of Cold War origin—‘Command’ has to do with the usability of nuclear weapons, and ‘control’ with the prevention of their use. At the heart of nuclear command and control lies the Always/Never Dilemma—weapons should work when directed and also never be used in the absence of authorized direction. The threats that aggravate the dilemma are the potential for unwanted use and decapitation; accidental use and unauthorized use.

The nuclear command and control system of a country is based on its nuclear doctrine, policy and posture. The nuclear command and control system links the strategic concepts of a country to the nuclear weapons. Neither the strategic concepts nor the nuclear weapons themselves demonstrate deterrence, but it is demonstrated by the nuclear posture permeated through the nuclear command and control system. If properly developed, C2 serves the deterrent interest of a state and at the same time helps to avoid inadvertent, unauthorised, or accidental use of nuclear weapons.

C2 involves assured high-level (preferably political) control of nuclear forces; the prevention of accidental, irrational or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons; the assurance of nuclear weapons operations to meet the requirements of strategy; and, arrangements for escalation control and nuclear war termination.

In the South Asian context, the unique, crisis-prone environment makes issues of command and control important. India–Pakistan relations constantly remain on the edge: crises suddenly emerge and deepen rapidly, with rapid troop assembly, sabre-rattling political rhetoric and nuclear signalling. Point at issue here is whether a stable nuclear relationship can be constructed in South Asia. Much of the answer to this question rests on whether robust command and control (C2) arrangements can be put in place to meet the requirements of stable deterrence.

The small size of India and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal does not imply that the command and control structure would be simple. It would require the same infrastructure, capabilities, and operating
concepts possessed by countries with larger number of nuclear weapons, but maybe on a smaller scale. A small arsenal is easy to control, but then it is vulnerable to attack, and hence the issue of command and control becomes more complex.

Both India and Pakistan practice a control-oriented rather than a command-oriented nuclear posture. India and Pakistan enhance the stability of their relationship by keeping their weapons in a disaggregated condition. Delivery vehicles are not mated with warheads, and the warheads themselves are not assembled—nuclear cores are stored separately from the remaining components. This allows control over the crucial and potentially problematic factor of time. The two states have installed Nuclear Command Authority—the nodal agency for all command, control and operational decisions regarding the nuclear weapons arsenal.

An area of concern in terms of control involves people. First, the record of proliferation in the region has been a discomfiting one. On the Pakistani side, revelations about the entrepreneurial activities of AQ Khan have shown the region’s immense potential for the spread of nuclear materials and knowledge.

The second problem, which compounds the first, is that terrorism abounds in the region. Several of the terrorist groups active in the region are linked to Al Qaeda, which is known to have had an interest in acquiring nuclear capability. This creates the possibility of nuclear terrorism that could seriously destabilise South Asia. Unlike the Indian nuclear command-and-control structure, which is dominated by a civilian authority under the leadership of the prime minister, Pakistan’s nuclear command system has been placed under the control of a military-dominated NCA—another issue of concern keeping in mind the current political imbroglio in Pakistan.

Possible improvements include installation of Personnel Reliability Measures, Code management, sophisticated Permissive Action Links (PALS)—a system which has two separate electronic operators that requires enter codes to arm and launch nuclear warheads—and possible outside assistance in crisis management.

Although the region is often labelled ‘the most dangerous place on earth’, the fact remains that, through all the crises, tension and rhetoric in the region, nuclear weapons have played no direct role. Despite learning from the experience of the N-5, both India and Pakistan still face the technical challenges of developing, deploying and maintaining a robust nuclear command and control system in the subcontinent.

Many of the requirements are presently in the process of being met on both sides. This does not mean there are no risks, gaps or potential instabilities, but it does suggest that the nuclear situation is more stable and the problems more subtle.
III. INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL

Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Security Issues

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In the following work I have dealt about the nuclear deal between India and united states of America and the consequence in the security regarding world peace and especially south asia. I have also made an effort to analyse the difficulties in enacting this by-law between both the countries and also what the act means and intends.

The following features in the Hyde act and 123 agreement needs reiteration:

- 123 means section 123 of U.S atomic energy act, which prohibits united states from transferring nuclear technology to any other countries.

- Hyde act is an exemption to the act, for exempting only India from the clutches of the act.

Right from the inception of this act it has been put under several pressures to both the parties. The Congress government in India was constantly threatened by the allies for withdrawing their support, if the deal went through further considerations, which they also did. Secondly the NSG waits for a chance to do its scrutiny for the proposed deal, but in the recent meeting concluded by the nuclear suppliers group they declared their consent by showing a green flag, except for Australia which has not agreed to supply uranium to India.

At the global level, the concerns are as following: if India is given an access to the global nuclear market, it will secure all its indigenous uranium reserves to enrich its nuclear warfare; and empowering India with nuclear capabilities will create a insecurity in South Asia.

Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Implications for India

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In 2005 the George Bush administration announced to negotiate a civilian nuclear deal with India. This
move represents a transformation in the American non-proliferation policy. This transformation is as a result of a new US strategic vision which has been chosen to reflect a rapidly changing global security environment. The key policy of the proposed deal is to balance non-proliferation goals with other foreign policy objectives and this shift remains relevant with respect to American export interest as well as the technology transfer and democratic values which India possesses. Dating back to 1999 and 2001, ‘democracy’ factor was viewed as a stabilizing force for Asia and Middle East and began to consider India as a ‘natural ally’.

There were three pressing geopolitical concerns for the new strategic framework. Firstly, the growing power of China, which aspires to become an Asian power. Secondly Iran’s nuclear weapons program which has been a constant source of concern and lastly the volatile and unstable political condition of Pakistan. The events of 9/11 set these policy changes in motion after the occurrence of which US and India strengthened its defence ties to an unprecedented degree and high-technology trade tripled in and value over the next two years (2002-2004).

In the energy front it is obvious that India will have access to the latest technology in civilian nuclear energy generation as also the fuel for the same. Currently Indian civilian nuclear energy programme produces 2400 MW of energy and the indigenous nuclear energy production can at best be enhanced to 10,000 MW with the available fuel. Thus to compliment other resources which has been the minimum Indian nuclear energy requirement is estimated to be 40,000 MW. Despite more than fifty years of generous funding, nuclear power currently amounts to only 3,300 megawatts, barely three percent of India’s installed nuclear capacity and the only way India can meet this demand is by importing from US and other nuclear capable countries in a big way.

On the military front, there would no longer be a trade off between uranium for electricity generation and weapons plutonium production. The deal will allow India access to international uranium market, this will enable it to free up more of its domestic uranium for its nuclear weapons program. As against the number of war heads and their level of sophistication, India can now concentrate on the modernization of delivery means, their longer range and accuracy will be an asset to counter potential threats such as China and Pakistan. Thus India could, for example build third weapon plutonium reactor and begin enriching uranium for weapons. Most importantly, India being a country with No First Use nuclear doctrine can now develop its second strike capability through supplying enriched uranium for the nuclear submarine.

The deal has also opened doors for traders and business organizations in both the countries. A group of scholars are of the opinion that business and commercial interests that are transforming the two nuclear-unfriendly nations into strategic partners. Earlier, greater economic interplay was handicapped by the question of India’s nuclear status which has improved tremendously in the recent decades. Apart from the above facts, the US economy has not been functioning as per the predictions of the policy makers and has not seen development in nuclear activities in the past few years which does not augur well for a country like US. From the Indian perspective, increase in the electricity generation capacity through nuclear means will require plant investment of more than $100 billion.
Sensing this lucrative market, the US nuclear lobby is widely believed to have acted behind the scenes for the smooth passage of the nuclear co-operation bill. Companies like Areva, GE, Westinghouse and Rosatom were the key interest players and the public sector Nuclear Power Cooperation of India is a key beneficiary. One obvious opportunity is that US companies will be allowed to sell both nuclear reactors and technology to India. According to US India Business Council (USIBC) has predicted business of $150 billion.

The economic and the military implication will definitely have repercussions on the existing relationships of India. It could be said that among the India-Russia-China axis and India-US-Israel alliance, India’s inclination to the latter is increasing in my opinion. The invitation for India for the first time to attend the Israel-Palestine summit in Annapolis in the US was a sign of the visible change in the shifting relationships. The Indian strategic and political experts decided that it was essential for India to engage with the sole super power to attain global status, bypass nuclear apartheid and get superior high tech items. In a way this attitude puts an end to the ambiguity in India’s foreign policy and the vision of the country.

The relationship with Russia was not sacrificed but it certainly has come into the US bandwagon. Though it was encouraged by the commercial prospects, it was alarmed of the motivations of India which made Russia to press India to sign an intellectual property rights agreement. Lately, it has become concerned about India’s cold feet about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the India-Russia-China triangle. This could have possibly led to the delay in leasing the nuclear submarine.

Pakistan and China are obviously worried because the deal could alter the strategic landscape of the world with India becoming the sole country which would be recognized as a nuclear power without signing the CTBT or NPT. This fear was reaffirmed with US stating that India would become a global player. Another disappointing factor is the denial by the ‘Big Brother’ to strike a similar deal with Pakistan with the A Q Khan’s episode still fresh in their memories.

With respect to the Iran issue, India voted twice against India in the nuclear issue which according to be could be the result of pressure from US. This has led to deterioration of the relationship between the two as a result of which the gas pipe line has become uncertain. This has however opened new doors for Iran, with China supplying new weapons system with a view to Iran-US conflict. India’s vote against Iran and proximity towards the US is being interpreted as India’s support towards an anti-Islamic state by some political parties and experts. Thus the Deal seems to have indicated communalisation of India’s foreign policy.

It could be said that the exception being made for India is very much within the tradition of the NPT in the first place—a regime built around an unexceptional date, January 1, 1967—and the door was opened for further exceptions to be made, which has been made by countries of the NSG which is a major breakthrough for the talks.
IV. GLOBAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Nuclear Disarmament: Is peace worth fighting for?

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No-first-use, legally binding agreements, proliferation, stockpiling, and deterrence are some phrases and terms that have been occupying mind space of every individual by being one of the most important and indispensable aspect of discussions at every level, right from a dinner table conversation to the most bombastic conclaves and conferences. Nuclear Disarmament as an issue, problem, stumbling block or an opportunity for economic advancement is inescapable. Be it the brain child (today) of the "Big four" or the "Quartet" or an idealistic ambition of a visionary prime minister this Discussion rather Debate stages a comeback after Twenty years

The most difficult aspect of nuclear disarmament is the question of defining DISARMAMENT as a concept. While the dictionary definition restricts itself to the quantitative reduction, it’s hard to classify or tabulate disarmament into a process or practice or policy. In the theology of nuclear weapons Nuclear Disarmament, on one hand is a very pragmatic and much needed strategic vision while on the other hand is an identified and much glorified, sometimes it is a "utopian" mission and sometimes rhetoric. Nuclear disarmament is all of this and more. And in the present day scenario it is an unavoidable Reality. It is a way of life.

There are those states which have weapons, those who don’t and a third category of those who could have the weapons but voluntarily, unilaterally decided not to cross to threshold which bring us to the classification, as spoken by Mr. Mani Shankar Aiyer; Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) and Threshold Nuclear Weapon States (TNWS). Each of these, carry with them strategic objectives which might not always be morally credible.

While the NWS justify their stand by due to the existence of security dilemma or a threat (which is perceived than conspicuous), NNWS are so, (mostly) not voluntarily but because of their inability to be or become “Nuclear”. No logical or moral explanation has been thought of (yet) about the TNWS, it will only be a short while before we will know of the underlying reason which will be more political than anything.

None will live to tell the tale!

Call it blissful ignorance or the negation of the most obvious future; people sometime refuse to come to terms with what will be the most natural next step. An all out nuclear war, massive destruction, unimaginable death tolls etc... , will no longer be things that one can conveniently abhor if we continue

“Pakistan and China are obviously worried because the deal could alter the strategic landscape of the world with India becoming the sole country which would be recognized as a nuclear power without signing the CTBT or NPT. This fear was reaffirmed with US stating that India would become a global player”
to tread the current path. About a century ago the economist Norman Angell gained great fame when he spoke about the economic rationale behind the impossibility of a war in the European continent and yet five years later, the same region was embroiled in a war which began in 1914 after killing millions of people. So, the complacency in the argument that that there will never be any use of nuclear weapons will no longer be valid in this world where any sort of global or universal good is being treated as a “utopian” school of thought.

As in the terms of a “growth-sustainability” paradox, the options being spelt out so far have been either the strategic reduction of arms or complete non-proliferation henceforth. The issue of vertical proliferation, in the opinion of many nations unfair and illogical due to its ability to provide impetus for horizontal proliferation as well. And the two options aforementioned are more for arms control rather than a definitive solution towards a world free of nuclear weapons. However the only plausible and possible way out of this situation is “Disarmament”.

Nuclear disarmament is as indivisible as the atmosphere that encompasses us, as morbid and all-pervasive as the spread of the HIV virus, as classified a piece of information as the policies of a nation and as rapid and voracious as the growth rates of the economies today.

There is no contesting the differences, difficulties, doubts and misgivings that lie in understanding Nuclear Disarmament as a concept or a policy to be followed. As mirth among the various strategic experts, so called pragmatist leaders, policy makers and people whose opinions are of “high regard” will continue for a while now, non-proliferation can no longer be ignored or mocked at. The gulf between the goal and ground reality is wide and deep and cynicism or call it realism persists.

As in the famous words of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi: “First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win”- shall be the watchwords of a few of us who are sensitive and sensible enough to understand the fact that the world is not something we inherited from our ancestors but something we have borrowed from our predecessors.