Contemporary Pakistan is a comprehensive work, focusing on the following issues in Pakistani society; the political role of military, restoration of democracy, the struggling economy, growth of fundamentalism, and drug trafficking.

Discussing the present and future political role of military, Kuckreja describes the political situation in Pakistan as persistently praetorian. She is of the opinion that the antagonism between Nawaz Sharif and General Musharraf, originated in the Kargil fiasco and also resulted in some ?nascent intentions to organize a coup against Sharif on the part of Musharraf between end July and mid-September.? She argues that the precision with which the coup was carried out suggests that it was planned well in advance. However, her assumption that the ?military took the reigns of power not in the interest of the country, but to defend the crown of their chief? needs to be probed further.

During the last week of September 1999, rumours about a coup conspiracy came to the fore, prompted by the statement made by an official at the US State Department. However, William B Milam, the US Ambassador to Pakistan denied that the Clinton administration was apprehending any coup. Though it remains a mystery why Sharif suddenly chose to sack Musharraf, available literature does not indicate that there was a conspiracy for a coup before October 12, 1999. The coup rather seems to be an instant reaction to the removal of General Musharraf.

The second major issue in contemporary Pakistan is its economy. Has the military regime arrested the economic collapse that was facing Pakistan in October 1999? Has the effort made by the regime stemmed the slide? Kukreja could have focused more on this aspect. She believes that, ?it is a misperception to think that Pakistan has been very clever in managing the Osama bin Laden affair to its economic advantage. On the contrary, it is merely getting some compensation for the economic mess, it has been pushed into by US action.? She also writes, ?the bonanza of economic aid for Pakistan may look like a financial coup, but the gains are largely illusory? and agrees with an Indian commentator ?Pakistan?s economy is bound to suffer enormous damage by joining the US war against terrorism in Afghanistan.?

A look at the aid that Pakistan has been receiving from the international agencies reveals that it is more than ?some compensation.? Kukreja has not addressed the question whether the military regime has improved Pakistan?s economic condition. The economy was near collapse when the military took over in October 1999. Today, the economy seems to be in a better position, when compared to October 1999. One may not agree that the military regime has delivered its promised economic recovery, but certainly, there is no economic collapse as feared three years back.

Third major issue in contemporary Pakistan is the increasing fundamentalist threat. The rise of militant fundamentalism, as Kukreja observes, started during the Zia regime. But the question that she, and for that matter, most other analysts fail to explain is that, why did the Islamic Right fail to gain political ascendancy during 1989-1999? In other words, the Islamic Right in Pakistan grew only when the country was governed by the non-democratic regimes, and failed to gain political support whenever the country had a democratic system, however superficial it was.

Kukreja rightly points out the inability of the military regime to control the fundamentalist militant organizations. However, she makes a debatable point that ?General Musharraf seems to seek the support of the fundamentalist parties like Markaz Dawa wal-Irshad, Lashkar-e-Toiba and other religious parties?To save his skin, Musharraf has to obtain the support of the fundamentalist parties even at the cost of sanctions and pressures from the US and the western world?Musharraf?s close links with the Islamic fundamentalist terrorist were clearly demonstrated by the manner in which the notorious Lashkar-e-Toiba held its annual congregation near Lahore from 3 to 5 November 1999 and called for a Jihad as a holy war against India.? There are many flaws in this argument.

First, Markaz Dawa wal-Irshad and Lashkar-e-Toiba are not fundamentalist parties but organizations. In fact, the Lashkar is the armed wing of Markaz, which is a religious organization. There is a basic difference between the fundamentalist organizations and religious parties. Though the religious parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and JUI do not believe in democracy, but they participate in the political process. However, the fundamentalist organizations neither believe in democracy nor in political process. Second, the fact that Musharraf distanced himself from the Taliban and made an effort to curb the activities of the fundamentalist organizations would negate Kukreja?s argument that Musharraf needed the support of the fundamentalists for his own survival. Third, the Markaz hold a regional conference every year in Pakistan, where Jihad is glorified against infidels all over the world and not only against India. This annual conference cannot be seen as a proof for Musharraf?s links with the fundamentalist organizations.

It is also difficult to accept Kukreja?s thesis that General Musharraf was ?picked up by General Zia-ul-Haq for advancement on account of his religious beliefs as a Deobandi.? General Musharraf is seen by many, both inside and outside Pakistan, as far from a fundamentalist and in fact, as the best bet to get Pakistan out of its fundamentalist menace. Kukreja herself agrees later that Musharraf ?is considered by the US and his other Western allies as an important bulwark in the anti-terrorist fight, a moderate who needs to be supported and fortified.?

Fourth major issue is the problem faced by illegal cultivation and trafficking of drugs. Kukreja focuses on the causes and economic and political implications of drug trafficking in Pakistan. Her study of the drug barons and syndicates will prove very useful for any future research on the issue. This study could have been strengthened by giving recent statistics and analysing the current drug situation in Pakistan. She quotes The Nation editorial published in April 1989, ?The World bank says over 50 percent of the national economy could be illegal? Even the government efforts to curb drug trafficking were based on the reports and articles published in the 1980s. What is the current drug scenario? Analysing the drug trafficking situation in 2001-2, based on the statistics obtained in the 1980s would be misleading.

Though one may disagree with some of the points that Kukreja has touched on, the frame-work for the analysis of contemporary Pakistan is comprehensive and could be the basis for any future study of the subject.