Mullah Fazlullah: Challenges to the “Eliminate or Extradite” Approach
07 Jul, 2014 · 4552
D Suba Chandran analyses the potential obstacles to cooperation between Kabul and Islamabad towards ensuring the success of the latter's Operation Zarb-e-Azb
D Suba ChandranDirector
As a headline in one of the leading news papers read, Pakistan today wants Afghanistan to either “extradite” Mullah Fazlullah, the leader of the TTP, or “eliminate” him. Will such an approach with Afghanistan succeed, given the large-scale differences between Kabul and Islamabad?
After innumerable deliberations within Pakistan and the chimera of a dialogue with the TTP, the military operations have begun only now. But the harsh reality for Pakistan is: there are no similar operations from the other side of the Durand Line, or even a basic security template in Afghanistan to deal with those who are currently crossing the border between the two.
General Asim Saleem Bajwa, in one of his Inter-Service Public Relations (ISPR) briefings in early July commented that “the leader of the TTP Mullah Fazlullah is sitting across the border in Kunar or Nuristan and Afghanistan needs to do something about it.” Perhaps he is, and perhaps Afghanistan should do something about it.
Is Fazlullah a priority for Kabul?
Though a section within Pakistan believes that Kabul in fact colludes with Fazlullah (along with India and the US of course), it is a farfetched proposition. Fazlullah may not be a priority for Afghanistan, as Hafiz Saeed and Mullah Omar are not for Pakistan.
The politics of “trump cards” and “not our problem” approach have been played so far and will continue to play a crucial role in the role neighbours’ perceptions and subsequent actions against militancy and terrorism.
Across the Durand: Trust Deficit and Militancy
Similarly, a section within Pakistan even believes that the Afghan government secretly supports the TTP. Inherent tensions over the Durand Line between the two countries and the recent border clashes have created a huge gap between the Islamabad and Kabul. An added disadvantage for Pakistan is – many in Afghanistan do not trust Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), even if they find the political leadership sincere; and since the days of jihad against the Soviets, the Afghans believe that the ISI abused the relationship and would like to control Afghanistan rather than cooperating with them.
Neutralising the TTP: Is Pakistan Serious Now?
Given the reluctance within the political and military leadership in Pakistan to go against even the TTP, it would be a Herculean task to convince them to neutralise the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network.
Will Afghanistan prevent the movement of the TTP within its soil without a quid pro quo? Even if it wants to pursue the TTP in its border provinces, does Kabul have enough firepower to undertake a parallel operation across the Durand Line? No doubt, the militants belonging to the Afghan Taliban, or the TTP or the al Qaeda – are a threat to the entire region. But until now, despite the pressure from its own public, the leadership in Pakistan has not realised it.
This will pose a huge challenge for Pakistan to achieve any substantial success in Operation Zarb-e-Azb.
Bangladesh Elections: Would the Shahbagh Upsurge Bring the Awami League Back?
Suvolaxmi Dutta Choudhury · 06 Jun, 2013 · 3982
Pakistan’s Power Crisis: A Bridge Too Far?
Somya Chhabra · 06 Jun, 2013 · 3981
IPCS Discussion: Pakistan Elections 2013
Portia B. Conrad · 06 Jun, 2013 · 3980
India, China and the Brahmaputra River: Beyond the Flood Data Agreement
Roomana Hukil · 06 Jun, 2013 · 3979