To Achieve Non-Weaponised Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia
16 Oct, 1997 · 19
Maroof Raza beleives that Non-Weaponized Deterrence would not only build on the existing situation in South Asia, but also support the logic of nuclear arms reduction between the United States and Russia
There is general acceptance that nuclear weapons do exercise a degree of restraint on war prone neighbours resorting to force. In the opinion of some, nuclear weapons have kept wars at bay in
In the recent past, two specific nuclear deterrent strategies have been suggested, namely, Recessed Deterrence, a term attributed to Jasjit Singh (and now being propounded by General K. Sundarji) and Non-Weaponized Deterrence, proposed by George Perkovich. There are some differences between the two strategies.
Recessed Deterrence allows for the fabrication of warheads and other components of nuclear weapons. Non-Weaponized Deterrence, as the name implies, suggests that the two parties could retain fissile materials and nuclear weapon components but would stop short of manufacturing warheads. With Recessed Deterrence, nuclear weapons have no tactical role and are only to be used to deter a nuclear attack. However, Non-Weaponized Deterrence, along with confidence building measures, would help in deterring the nuclear genie without the costs and instabilities of deployed nuclear arsenals. To achieve a stable Non-Weaponized Deterrence regime, both
o Non-deployment of nuclear capable missiles
o Cessation of fissile material production
o Non-configuration and exercise of force for nuclear roles
o Furtherance of nuclear confidence building measures
By institutionalising such a regime we could mitigate the worst effects of nuclear proliferation while satisfying domestic constituencies in
However, the key element of a Non-Weaponized DeterrenceRegime would be a verifiable cut off of fissile materials production. This is an important issue relating to both Recessed and Non-Weaponized deterrence. Verification could include mutually agreed bilateral or international verification arrangements regarding other activities, as for instance, the non-assembly of nuclear cores, non-deployment of weapons/missiles, cessation of fissile materials production and non-conduct of nuclear explosive tests. Though it is unlikely that
Non-Weaponized Deterrence would not only build on the existing situation in
Ten Years of Ceasefire along the LoC: Perspectives from Poonch
KD Maini · 03 Dec, 2013 · 4206
Japan’s Revised Defence Posture in 2013: An Assessment
Angana Guha Roy · 30 Nov, 2013 · 4205
India & Bangladesh: A Breakthrough in Water Relations?
Roomana Hukil · 30 Nov, 2013 · 4204
Thailand & Cambodia: End of Clashes over Preah Vihear?
Aparupa Bhattacherjee · 30 Nov, 2013 · 4203