Panelists: Srikant Kondapalli & Dr. Madhu Bhalla
Chair: Major General Dipankar Banerjee

Dipankar Banerjee

The joint military exercises held last August were a significant development in Asia and has important implications for India. It symbolised a kind of a coming together of two large Asian military powers under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Is it to counter the NATO in Asia, develop a new military relationship between former adversaries or a mere anti-terrorist military manoeuvre? Whatever be the present intention or their full possibilities, this has the potential to be of larger consequence for Asia. In particular, the exercises have major implications for Japan, the US and India, as well as an attempt to check American influence in the region. It should also be noted that China is undergoing significant changes in its military capabilities and modifications to its security doctrine. The recent space launch was an appropriate example of the level of technical excellence that has been achieved by China and its military in recent years.

Srikant Kondapalli

The Russia-China joint military exercises called the 'Peace Mission 2005' were carried out from 18 to 25 August 2005. Three major missions occurred during this period. The Liaodong region in China was the venue for two of these exercises. The significance of this place lies in the fact that it was here that Russia had lost a war against Japan in 1904-1905. Holding the exercises may be seen as a kind of symbolic statement that Russia was back in reckoning.

The backgrounds to the history of relations between the two countries will help analysing the significance of these exercises. The 1950 Treaty of Friendship between Russia and China led to 156 projects of cooperation between them. Of these 41 were military industrial activities, engaged in the development of conventional as well as strategic weapons. The subsequent freeze in relations that lasted from 1960 to 1989 led to a cold war like situation between them. The Sino-US rapprochement between 1971 and 1979 was driven by the need to contain the Soviet Union.

The subsequent normalization of relations between Russia and China in the post-Cold War era immensely benefited the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), as it could move troops away from China's northeast borders towards the southeast near Taiwan. The next step in this thaw was the July 2001 Strategic and Cooperation Treaty signed between them. It was inspired by the 1971 and Peace and Friendship Treaty between India and the Soviet Union. Russia and China had earlier planned joint exercises in 2002, which did not happen. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for conducting joint exercises was signed in 2004.

It is important to look at the factors that triggered such a decision. The eastward expansion of NATO, Russia's vulnerability in Chechnya and American unilateralism in Iraq have given cause to both countries to jointly opposes U.S. hegemony and its blatant violation of state sovereignty principle. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMAs) happening in countries such as Taiwan, Japan, India and South East Asia have deepened the threat perceptions for China. The exercises are a demonstration of China's successful military modernisation programmes that are taking place currently. The exercise also signifies the rise of China as a major military power in Asia.

The exercises were divided into three phases. The first phase was about strategic planning, the second phase was important in terms of joint declarations and troop movements and in the third phase, amphibious assaults were carried out. There was a conflict of objectives in the third phase as China wanted it to focus on Taiwan.

Speaking about the objectives of the exercises, the Chinese Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan said that the exercises were not aimed at a third party. The aim was to further strengthen Sino-Russian mutual trust and capability to jointly strike terrorism, extremism and separatism. The explicit focus of the exercises was counter-terrorism. Russia held that the exercises constituted a practice of the new concept of security advocated by China. There was a disjunction of the motives of the two sides, with Russia stressing on bilateral aspects of the relations, whereas China stressed on maintaining peace and stability in Asia and Asia-Pacific.

The joint exercises were not an exclusive event. China has conducted several exercises on counter-terrorism in the recent past. The Coalition 2003 Exercises in August 2003 in Eastern Kazakhstan and Yili; the November 2003 operations in Lhasa; Joint search and rescue operations conducted with the Pakistan Navy in October 2004 in Shanghai are some examples. Russia too has conducted joint exercises with countries such as the United States and India. These exercises are unique in terms of bilateral military relations they have promoted between Russia and China.

Russia deployed 1,800 troops, 17 long-range military transport planes and fighter jets like Tu-95MSs and Tu-22M-3s, Su- 27s among others. China had 8,000 troops present along with three destroyers, frigates, submarines and 50 aircrafts. SCO members as well as observers from Mongolia, India, Pakistan and Iran were present.

The joint exercises have considerable security implications. It is indicative of the internal churning in China i.e. the transition from playing an economic to a greater political role in Asia. There is now a stress on moving away from concealing capability and biding for time towards active display of force among Chinese policy makers. It should also be noted that the exercises were conducted keeping preparedness for probable conflict scenarios in the region in mind. The spectrum included North Korea in case there is a regime collapse and the Six Party talks broke down, the volatile situation in Central Asia following various 'colour' revolutions and erupting tensions with Japan and Taiwan. Another speculation is that the camaraderie is a sign of bipolarity in the making. China had earlier rejected suggestions of holding a joint exercise with the United States. The present exercises were marked by absence of any American representation. It was a statement of sorts to the United States to restrict its activities in Asia. The latter down played the event by stressing that regional stability in Asia Pacific would not be affected by such exercises.

The implications of the joint exercises for India lie in terms of the choices it may be compelled to make in the future. It may be forced to take sides that may not be to its liking as it happened on the IAEA resolution concerning Iran. It is significant that after the last SCO summit, Uzbekistan set a deadline for the United States to remove its bases from its territory. India was present at the meeting as an observer. The military modernisation program of China is also a matter of some concern. The latter wants Tu-95 and Tu- 22 to counter the U.S. Pacific fleet. It placed an order for 30 IC-76s and some IL-78s at the end of the exercises.

Madhu Bhalla

The basic questions that arise from these joint military exercises are; how did they come about and where will the joint partnership go from here? A significant change in Chinese foreign policy since 1996 has been its formal engagement into alliances and institutional interactions. Its grand strategy has changed from playing a balanced role to taking an activist role in defining global agendas. At the bilateral level too, it has been seen moving towards alliance like structures. China has used diplomacy to great effect and has evolved a range of policies to deal with external powers.

Relations with Russia have been pursued at both the bilateral and multilateral level. The imperative for multilateral engagement arises out of China's need to assure the world against any threat from the rise of China. The 2001 treaty of friendship was an extension of this policy of assurance. Diplomatic initiatives in Asia-Pacific and through the SCO forum have similar intentions. Its efforts can be termed as 'diplomacy of reassurance'. The Six Party talks were an initiative to define itself as an Asian power.

Several significant geo-strategic and political factors can be identified in Russia-China relations. U.S. foreign policy under the presidency of George W. Bush came up with a morally driven argument for missile defence. The policy of realism and activism had implications for Russia and China in Chechnya and Xinjiang respectively. Such American postures have sent wrong messages to the twp countries and brought them together.

An important factor continuously identified is the upgradation of their defence relations. This has been discussed since 2001, though their respective motives differ in promoting such a relationship. Some issues that were central to their bilateral relations were, defence arrangements, developing safer borders, ensuring certainty in long term relations and preventing the other from walking into the U.S. camp. The explicit assertion that no third party was targeted through the exercises was a kind of putting a limit on this relationship. The limit was that there would be no antagonising the United States.

It should also be remembered that this upsurge in bilateral relations in no way signifies the building of an alliance. The 2001 treaty was a move to sum up the past ten years of relations and it certainly provided the flexibility for relations with other countries to both sides. It is clear that this is a reluctant partnership driven wholly by necessity. The United States, North Korea and Central Asia are primary factors in this necessity. Putin's ascent to power in Russia increased the unease of the West. He is not comfortable with the expansion of NATO and has been criticised for his state policies, which are exceedingly unitary in nature. He has suspected the United States of wanting to split Russia in the wake of the colour revolutions occurring all over the Caucasus and Central Asia. It should be remembered that there is no overt interdependence visible in the relations between the two countries, except in arms trade. This too may not last as China's modernisation may outgrow what Russia is able to provide. It will be important to note what turn their bilateral relations will take if unilateralism declines.

Comments

• There are three issues of concern in the light of the above discussions. The major aspect of Russia-China relations has been the arms trade. With relations being upgraded to the strategic level, it is important to consider its implications e.g. on Russia and Japan relations. Secondly, it is clear that a period of Chinese assertion in Asia has begun. However, this is the first time that it is demonstrating its military might. What this connotes remains to be seen. Lastly, the implications for India have to be examined. How will such a bilateral strategic relation affect India's relations with China and the United States? It should be analysed if China is sending a message to the South East Asian countries about their growing relations with India.

• Regarding the American presence in Central Asia, it is clear that it will not leave in a hurry. The East Asia Summit to be held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 following the APEC summit will signify changes in the balance of power.

• The present exercises have to be seen in the context of the earlier exercises conducted by Russia and Kazakhstan. The Chinese saw this as an effort to paint them as a hegemon in Central Asia. Here lies the genesis of evolving counter-terrorism as the objective of the exercises. Otherwise, its goals were completely different.

• Three things need to be remembered while talking about the exercises. Firstly, the United States is in a withdrawal syndrome from Central Asia. It will be the application of soft American power along with NATO's role, which will be relevant in Central Asia rather than troop mobilisation in the future. Also, the United States needs to reconsider its entire alliance system. This is so as China wields a huge political and economic influence over East Asia, excluding Japan and Australia. Lastly, there is as such no grand strategy visible in the improving bilateral relations of the two countries. Russia is using China's military power as leverage against the United States and Europe.

• There are four strands in the present discussion on Sino-Russian relations. One, it is aimed at overcoming the mutual distrust between the two countries. Secondly, the exercises help China to piggyback on the Russian Army to showcase its military modernisation. Thirdly, there is an implicit message here to the United States that if these countries are pushed far, they may respond by forming a grand alliance. It is important that the rest of the world and India especially watch the Chinese military's rise carefully.

• One point that has been missed so far in this discussion is that military exercises are never held without a political impetus. A context has been created by the Rumsfeld visit to China.

Questions & Answers

Question: Can it be said that China is in the driver's seat. Considering the Russian interests in the arms sales is it that China is acting from a position of dominance?
Answer: China is in the driver's seat in the SCO and its influence over it is strong. China needs the SCO to balance the global power structure in Asia. China is not only an economic power but is also a well-defined Asian power. Russia has still not been able to resolve its identity of whether it is a European or an Asian power. Putin's first term was focussed on Europe. This acts as a disadvantage in mutual relations.

Question: Both China and Russia have self-serving goals in this relationship. While Putin's policy has been to secure Russia's 'Near Abroad', China wants to extend into Central Asia as a part of its activism to ensure its energy security. Considering that there is a conflict of interests between the two countries in the exercise too, what can be said about the two balancing each other out?
Answer: Russia needs to balance China. The relationship is not completely arms trade-centric. Russia believes that China will pose a problem to it by 2015. India too will need to balance the concerns of both the United States and China in its foreign policy. The latter expects India not to pursue such policies or further relations with the United States in a way that affect the interests of China. In 15-20 years, India will be forced to make such a choice.

Question: A further comment on how the military relations can be described was requested from the speakers.
Answer: China has wanted extensive military relations with Russia. These are to be pursued in the short term, which was to end in 2002, mid term, which would be till 2007, and long term, which extends till 2010. Cooperation on Research and Development (R&D) and exchanges on military and defence technology are the high points of such a relationship. Russia has had more flexibility than China on the issue of the United States. China had more to lose from the American pursuit of missile defence than Russia. The asymmetrical Chinese and American missile defence capabilities pushed China into the arms of Russia.

Question: How can the Chinese swing strategy be assessed? What is the inducement that the United States can offer to China in the long term to get it on its side? What are the chances of India being included in a trilateral exercise with Russia and China?
Answer: China's alliance with Russia is event and issue based. The moment their bargaining power improves, the two countries will individually negotiate with the United States. In addition, a trilateral exercise between India, Russia and China is difficult, as China will not agree to it. During the joint military exercises, there was no formal invitation to India except to join in exercises, which can be held within the SCO framework.

Final Remarks

Dipankar Banerjee

For Russia, the Central Asian region is very important; it is in a sense its soft under belly. It is trying to secure its influence there, which it has lost significantly in recent years. The thrust of its policy in Central Asia is to get the Americans out of the region and include the Central Asian countries once again into a security framework. Russia's postulation of involving India in a joint exercise has no significance and depth. The Chinese foreign policy will not support such a move. It is important that India balance its relations with the United States and China very carefully. The perception of India not mattering is slowly changing and India can no longer be excluded from the calculation of either, particularly from China. It is also time that India develops a well-crafted China policy that takes account China's growing comprehensive power and both engages and counters it effectively in Asia. It should neither react nor necessarily be receptive to pressure from outside.