A comprehensive and consistent approach to the management and use of force is an important ingredient of any counter insurgency policy. Though the management of internal order is the responsibility of State Governments in India, the growing complexity of internal security threats and its deepening linkages with external environment, expanding frontiers of criminality and increasing inability of State police organizations to deal with existing and emerging security challenges has necessitated a greater role for Central Para-Military Forces (CPMF) that have become an important instrument of force at the disposal of the Union Government. For some time now, there have been demands for a thorough reassessment of their role. The Group of Ministers Report on National Security observed, “The CPMFs have often been diverted for prolonged deployment on a variety of duties other than those for which they were raised. This has adversely affected their training and recuperation schedule. It is strongly felt that each Para-Military Force should revert to its original role, for which it was raised, equipped and trained.”

In line with these recommendations, the Union Government decided to rationalize the role of CPMFs. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) will now take over the internal security management of Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeastern States by 2005. A total of 64 more battalions would be raised and Rs.543 crores spent to raise these battalions and modernize their weaponry, communications and training system. The question arises here as to what extent the CRPF is prepared to deal with existing and emerging internal security challenges? Does the structural and institutional profile of the force suit the kind of role being assigned to it?

The CRPF, an Armed Force of the Union, was created with a limited purpose to assist State Governments/Union Territories in police operations to maintain law and order. It was envisaged that that it would only be used for short durations in exceptional circumstances and work under the civil administration of the State Governments; hence its operational framework was kept limited. Over the years, however, the range of duties, nature of deployment and operational requirements of the force expanded phenomenally. At present, apart from routine law and order deployment in various States, approximately 50 per cent of the force is committed to the Northeastern states, while one-third is deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. This has resulted in a massive growth of the CRPF. From one battalion in 1939, the Force has grown to 141 battalions at present, with approximately 90 percent of the force on permanent deployment in sensitive areas.

However, there has been no thought given of a well-structured policy to govern its deployment. As a result, the CRPF has been an overworked and over stretched, which has adversely affected its combat worthiness, performance, organizational cohesiveness and working conditions. Moreover, prolonged deployment in sensitive areas and resultant stress has affected its psychological preparedness. The training infrastructure of the force has not been upgraded to meet the emerging security threats, and the CRPF has been used in an ad-hoc manner.

During its deployment in various states for law and order duties, CRPF personnel are placed at the disposal of civilian authorities in the state. Unclear rules and lack of coordination, and at times the different perceptions of State and Union Governments makes their functioning difficult. Over the years, the State police organizations also have not been upgraded to deal with emerging threats to internal security. The repeated demands to reform and restructure state police organizations have been resisted by vested interests.

As far as counter insurgency operations are concerned, the performance of the CRPF largely depends on effective coordination between State Government agencies, CPMFs, army and intelligence agencies. There has been no effort to devise an effective structure of coordinated or unified command and control. The various forces tend to operate independently of one another, and often at cross-purposes. Unfortunately, India has not yet evolved a clear doctrinal paradigm for joint operations.

Therefore, for the effective utilization of the CRPF, we need to conceptualise the challenges that arise out of contemporary internal security challenges. A well-designed response to these challenges should include inter alia, reevaluation of the role and mandate of the CRPF, including an effective deployment policy and modernization plan, preparing state police organizations to deal with internal security problems, creating suitable structures and processes to ensure better coordination among different forces, civilian authorities and intelligence agencies. In the absence of these measures, the CRPF would not be able to discharge its duties effectively.