India-Australia Ties: Time for More than Cricket
Kimberley Layton
Research Intern, IPCS
e-mail: wheres_kim@hotmail.com

It is time for India and Australia to give the bilateral security relationship the attention it deserves. The democratic bond – often remarked upon as the foundation for India-Australia relations – has become amplified by more tangible mutual concerns such as terrorism, a shared reliance on the smooth functioning of energy markets and maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Southeast Asia in particular could significantly benefit from more focus on these key areas. It is in this region that, due to reasons of geography, that Indian and Australian strategic interests converge. 

India has struggled with terrorism for an extensive period of time and consequently, counterterrorism objectives feature prominently in its security planning. Though attention has traditionally been on domestic threats, increasing instances of international terrorism mean that the focus is necessarily shifting. Unlike India, Australia has only recently been confronted by terrorism. 23 Australians were killed in the 9/11 terrorist strikes, and 92 in Bali’s twin Jemaah Islamiyah attacks. Though the numbers are small compared to Indian statistics, for a country with a population of only 21 million people, they are quite significant. Combating terrorism is one of Australia’s top security priorities and the country has been a rigorous supporter of regional and international counterterrorism efforts.

Addressing the threat of terrorism from a Southeast Asian regional perspective allows for Australia and India to work together on new initiatives; each can bring something valuable to the discussion. In August 2003, Australian and Indian Foreign Ministers signed a Memorandum of Understanding on counterterrorism and in 2007 the two nations established a bilateral Defence Information Sharing Arrangement that makes possible information sharing in the agreed priority areas of counterterrorism, maritime security and peacekeeping. At present, the challenge is to give practical expression to bilateral counterterrorism collaboration. Unfortunately, despite the urgent nature of the threat, progress in this area has so far been limited and slow; both countries could do more.

Australia will release its latest Defence White Paper at the end April 2009. This vital planning document will address the core strategic issues confronting the country and the key focus of it is alleged to be China. Meanwhile, the India-China relationship is somewhat uncertain. Though the two countries are working at bettering their political relations, increasing people-to-people contacts, and intensifying their economic relationship, Indian analysts express concern over China’s presence, particularly in the Indian Ocean. 

Southeast Asia covers the most strategically important area for China’s energy security and it is similarly important for Australia and India. The region encompasses all of China's energy-shipping routes from the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The importance of these waters to China poses a potential security challenge to both India and Australia. They must work to diffuse any negative effects of competition between powerful nations — including China, the United States, Japan and India itself — increasingly seeking to control this area. Ultimately, there must be an improved understanding of China’s role in the Northeast Indian Ocean (NEIO). Its activities there may not be an expression of any desire to confront or challenge India; however the opacity of Chinese behaviour does not help their cause. Australia could work with India and China through strategic dialogue in order to clarify China’s regional role and bring increased transparency to the situation.  

Generally, Australia and India have been in agreement for some time as to the importance of maritime security but as with counterterrorism measures, have struggled with how to progress the idea to reality. It is important for both countries to protect the sea-lanes that run through the NEIO and there is a need for cooperation to address the threats of piracy, terrorism and the illegal movement of people and materials, particularly drugs and weapons. In 2000, India hosted an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) anti-piracy workshop and joined the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). In 2007, India and Australia established a Maritime Security Operations Group and the Australian navy participated in the Malabar Exercise in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007. India had requested Australian participation for the first time in this annual maritime training exercise with the US, Singapore and Japan. 

Though India-Australia interaction has traditionally focused on ‘soft’ cultural and people-to-people ties, rather than ‘hard’ strategic linkages, the two countries are beginning to construct a solid security relationship. Neither country may be central to the others strategic planning, but they have enough common points of concern to make increased bilateral security cooperation worthwhile. Giving greater emphasis to this element of the relationship would help initiate serious strategic dialogue on maritime security in the Indian Ocean, and energy security, while expanding the present program of counterterrorism work. Such a relationship would greatly benefit Southeast Asia at a time when new and unfamiliar security threats are emerging and challenging regional stability. 

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