With respect to Afghanistan, this would entail getting the proportion of the negotiation-amenable Taliban on board. Pakistani good offices, rumored to maintain covert contact with these elements, can be taken advantage of. This may entail formulating an exit strategy and time schedule for foreign forces in return for cessation of violence by Taliban and compliance with anti Al Qaeda goals of the international community. Defining an inclusive end state and a time frame, instead of an expansive agenda, would pre-empt the counter, otherwise set to escalate and destabilize Pakistan. Second, with respect to Kashmir, India could reopen the autonomy issue with the newly-elected government, even if progressing the same is left to the next dispensation at New Delhi. The elections manifestos of parties should include their intent which the electorate can endorse at the polls. Were Pakistan to take credit for this would be small price to pay for a return to normalcy in the Valley. Third, nuclear assets figure as an issue with the hard-line school owing to its awareness that pressure could incite Pakistani recalcitrance. It is clear that an Islamist threat to these can only be tackled by the Pakistani Army currently in charge. US assistance can only be on invitation. US-Indian action can only lead to an avoidable threat to India. A political approach, to perhaps include a strategic dialogue, would instead reassure Pakistan on its nuclear assets.Lastly, by avoiding cohesion-sapping operations, the Army stands to retain its position atop Pakistani polity. While this may retard the pace of deepening of democracy, in preserving its Army, the political approach would help preserve Pakistan. The militarized approach carries the risk of tilting relative strength equations in favour of the Taliban-Islamist combine, as has been the steady trend over the past four years of Operation Al Mizan of the Pakistan Army.

Since American power has proven deficient and the Pakistani Army deterred, Obama's ascendance has era transcending portents. This is therefore the opportune moment to revise the agenda. Indian input into this should be through Indian interests as against those of the US or GWOT. These are predicated on a stable Pakistan with its core interests accommodated. It would be better for India, in fulfilling its role as a 'strategic partner', to sensitize Holbrooke - one known for a robust approach from his Balkans innings - along these lines.