All countries conduct military exercises. China is no exception. In recent times in fact, China has engaged in more military exercises than any other country. Some were on Chinese soil, others were conducted in distant waters, in association with important countries. Particular areas of focus included intelligence acquisition, joint command and control, and joint logistics. As a consequence, the PLA, which has not seen a major war since 1979, is expanding its force mobilization capabilities. ‘Stride-2009’, China’s largest tactical military exercise, is part of this capacity building. Already in progression, this exercise stretching for two months will test China’s long-distance mobility. As the global and regional implications of this are as yet being assessed, India could be the one at the receiving end.

 

For a continental country like China, force mobilization with precision and speed is sin qua non of its military modernization. In recent times, the PLA has improved its capability to support operations within its borders and along its periphery. For example, at the time of the Sichuan earthquake in May 2008, the PLA deployed thousands of troops quickly. However, the PLA also faced problems in providing timely logistic support, leaving many troops without the equipment and supplies necessary for an effective disaster relief operation. Hence, China’s January 2009 White Paper on Defence seeks ‘a national defence mobilization system that is centralized and unified, well structured, rapid in reaction, authoritative and efficient.'

 

China has many reasons for pushing forward the ongoing military exercise. First, it is expected to help identify the hurdles towards long distance movements and unfamiliar combat zones. Perhaps this explains why troops raised and trained in Lanzhou military region (MR) in north-west are being marched off to the Shenyang MR located in north-east of China and vice-versa. Second, the exercise should permit China to test its capabilities for greater coordination between the logistics and the fighting units, and streamline joint operations and long-range force projection. Third, since China has unleashed a ‘revolution in doctrinal affairs’ in recent times, the exercise will tell if doctrines such as ‘local wars under conditions of informationization and ‘military operations other than war (MOOTW)’ are realistic and capable of meeting China’s strategic goals. Last, the exercise should also reinforce PLA’s role in stabilizing the volatile situation in Xinjiang and Tibet.

 

The ongoing exercise, however, cannot immediately do away China’s inability to project and sustain military operations at locations distant from mainland. As this year’s Pentagon report concludes, the PLA can barely transport and sustain one division of ground troops and equipments by sea or air. PLA’s inflight refuelling capability is also limited and can support only small aircrafts. Similarly, the PLA Navy does not have an aircraft carrier and has limited replenishment capacity over long distances. The PLA’s force capability projection is likely to remain limited over the next decade unless the PLA Navy adds an aircraft carrier and maritime vessels.

 

That raises an important issue: who could be the target of China’s growing force mobilization capacity? Certainly not the US, though it must be taking notes that may well be reflected in the  2010 Quadrennial Defence Review. Next, it could be Taiwan, since much of China’s advanced weapons are placed in MRs opposite Taiwan. Most available studies predict the shifting balance of power in favour of China and the weakening position of Taiwan. In a report to the US – China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) in March 2009, Eric C Anderson and Jeffrey G Engstrom alleged that the ‘PLA is postured to conduct a range of offensive options in a Taiwan crisis and can complicate US responses’. Further, a July report by RAND apprehends that China could use its SRBMs to pound Taiwanese air bases. Subsequently, China could mobilize its air force and launch a full fledged air attack on Taiwan.

 

Unfortunately, no such studies are available about China’s capacity for similar force mobilization against India. It is possible that China could conduct the next force mobilization exercise between Lanzhou and Chengdu MRs that border India. Also, little information is available about the weaponry that China has placed in Inner Tibet, supplemented by massive infrastructure development that enhance rapid mobilization potential of PLA against India. In a hypothetical war scenario, China would like to run through the Himalayas and reach India’s doors at the earliest. It could use its MRBMs or Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) placed in interior Tibet to target vital spots in India.

 

Does India have the capacity to deter China? Perhaps not, since, India lags behind China in all aspects of force mobilization, force modernization and precision attacks. China is likely to conduct more exercises as part of the ‘Stride-2009’ series in coming days. The unlikelihood of an imminent war notwithstanding, India needs to study such exercises more carefully and hypothesize several war games scenario with China. That could possibly enable a timely and affordable response to China’s force mobilization in future. Hopefully, ‘Stride-2009’ will garner appropriate attention among Indian military planners.

 

Note: The author is on deputation to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The views expressed herein are those of the author alone.