The McChrystal Report and India
Uddipan Mukherjee
Lecturer, Kolkata
e-mail: uddi_m@yahoo.co.in
Is the inexorable march of the NATO-led coalition forces through the cobweb of insurgency in Afghanistan, coming to a grinding halt? That this appears to be inescapable for the US-spearheaded International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a prognosis put forward by Lt. Gen. McChrystal, the Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan and the ISAF.
The finalized draft of 66 pages, dated 30 August, 2009 was addressed to US Defence Secretary, Robert Gates and reached the Pentagon on 25 September. The thesis has generated a lot of debate among the US policy makers, within the US and abroad. India has been no exception. This is because of a direct reference to India in page 19 of the report in which India has been categorized under the rubric of “External Influences” in Afghanistan, along with Pakistan and Iran. What does this imply for India and its presence in the region?
In his report, McChrystal summarizes, “The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted…..the overall situation is deteriorating.” The US General endorses his President’s Af-Pak policy proclaimed on 27 March, 2009 whereby Obama decided to send more troops to Afghanistan, with the total number of American troops reaching 68,000. Reports say that McChrystal may be asking for troop enhancement to the tune of about 40,000 though his manuscript does not explicitly mention the number.
The General however, differs with his President on one vital aspect. He clearly states that mere troop build-up is not a necessary and sufficient condition for success in Afghanistan, although more soldiers are absolutely necessary for preventing a failure. He draws attention to a serious shortcoming of the coalition forces, i.e. not extending support to the Afghan masses. This has happened due to the inability of the foreigners to come out of their security cocoons. The controversy over fraud that marred the recent Afghan Presidential elections is a serious obstacle for the US-led forces since their credibility amongst the masses is at stake.
Hence, McChrystal talks about an ‘integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign’. The crux of the matter is that the Afghan masses need a secure environment, a solid institutional framework providing them justice and civil liberties. ISAF would have a major role to play in these issues by being physically and psychologically closer to the common Afghans.
He also advocates upgradation of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in order to increase its efficacy for the long term scenario. McChrystal is worried about the “lack of unity of effort and command” in ISAF and wants to “modify organizational structures” to achieve this unity.
Returning to the pertinent question concerning India, the report lauds the developmental activities pursued by India. At the same time, the report expresses concerns that Indian presence can accentuate regional tensions since Pakistan would object to a proactive Indian role in Afghanistan. The report asserts that there lies a ‘Pakistani hand’ behind this insurgency and also warns of fresh violence in Afghanistan as well as in India if Pakistani interests are harmed.
Does this mean Obama may urge both India and Pakistan to resume the Composite Dialogue? The resumption of the Composite Dialogue seems unlikely unless Pakistan acts on the dossiers supplied by India on 26/11. Is it that Obama favours Pakistan to India? He did announce a whopping US $7.5 billion to the former? But he also made it extremely clear that grants would flow into Pakistan ‘if and only if’ it supports USA in uprooting the safe havens of the Taliban and Al Qaeda from its territories.
In these complex circumstances, it would be naïve to expect India to scale down its activities in Afghanistan and Central Asia. At the same time, stuck with the ‘inherited’ quandary of Afghanistan, Obama may pressurize India to downplay its role in Afghanistan for the immediate future. But India’s Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh clearly stated in his post-Summit press briefing at Pittsburgh that there is no pressure on India to dilute its stakes in Afghanistan. Moreover, he also informed that ‘officially’ the US government has assured him of standing by India’s position regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). So, it would seem that weather is not inclement, as far as Indo-US relations in the Obama regime are concerned.
USA shall appreciate the fact that its ‘global war on terror’ is incomplete without India’s participation. Focusing solely on Pakistani help would be myopic. Pakistan has extended support to Taliban and Al Qaeda to serve its own interests in South Asia and there is no guarantee that the present political dispensation shall act differently. USA is probably not keen to pressurize Pakistan too strongly for fear that insurgents may get hold of its nuclear arsenal. And Pakistan is playing this ‘fear card’ to extract maximum leverage with respect to India.
New Delhi needs to take a firm stand in this ‘not so salubrious’ climate. Indian presence in Afghanistan or for that matter in Central Asia is strategic but not in any sense military. A few hundred Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) Forces in Afghanistan or an alleged Air Base in Tajikistan notwithstanding.
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