Whither China's defence?
Bhartendu Kumar Singh
Asstt. Controller General of Defence Accounts (Training)
e-mail:
bhartendukumarsingh@gmail.com
In a recent white paper, National Defense in 2006, China has once again pledged to pursue the road of peaceful development and work with other nations to build a peaceful, prosperous and harmonious world. It will continue a defence policy that is 'defensive' in nature. It is true that China's foreign policy has been pacifist in recent times. The logic of economic reforms has led China to offer incentives to its neighbours in bilateral disputes or to put them on the backburner. The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has not been on the offensive during the last two decades. However, those who are aware of China's strategic culture and military history would recognize the white paper declaration as nothing more than sham.
A close scrutiny of the white paper reveals the Chinese discomfort with the global and regional security environment. China finds serious imbalances in the international strategic alignment due to power games by major international forces (read the US). Some major developing countries and regional groupings have grown in power that may not be advantageous to China. The American dominance of international politics that China defines as hegemonic undercuts China's growing quest for power and influence in international relations.
This is all the more so in the Asia-Pacific region where the regional economy has maintained an unprecedented growth rate and which also has some potential conflict spots. After a brief period of apathy, the US has once again consolidated its realignment of military deployment to enhance its capability in the region. The US-Japan alliance military alliance is as strong as ever and the sole target seems to be containing Chinese influence in the region. China is also concerned about Japanese attempts to revise its 'pacifist' constitution and seek a more pro-active military posture. The missile and nuclear tests by North Korea have induced new instabilities in Northeast Asia. Taiwan continues to shun all unification attempts with the mainland and instead seeks an independent identity for itself in the comity of nations.
Obviously, a rising power like China cannot meet these challenges through a defensive defence. Power projection with offensive capabilities is a must for containing possible local conflicts and maintaining China's influence. Security analysts have witnessed how China has undergone a significant transformation from being merely a continental power to being both a continental and a maritime power in recent past. Further, as the white paper itself mentions, China is presently pursuing a three-step development strategy in modernising its armed forces. The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century.
China has also invested heavily in military modernisation. Since the late nineties, its defence budget has been growing in double digits. The success of economic reforms has made the regime liberal towards the PLA. Although official Chinese estimates, including the recent white paper, proclaim that defence expenditure is very low amounting to $35 billion in the current year, most estimates peg it at anywhere between $70-105 billion. China has used this money to continue its extensive military modernisation programme.
While other objectives of the PLA modernisation are yet to be probed, Taiwan seems to be a near-term target. With the 'one country, two systems' not finding favour with Taiwan, Beijing's patience is running out. China has already deployed over 600 missiles facing Taiwan and is still building up its deterrence capability in the region. If the history of China is any evidence, China's forces may go on an offensive at an opportune time to engage Taiwan in 'coercive diplomacy'.
In the long term, military clout may enable China to return to its traditional 'strategic offensive culture' and enforce a 'pax Sinica', or a 'peace on Chinese terms'. There are many issues with its neighbours where China might supplement its military superiority to force a diplomatic solution of its choice. Surprisingly, while scholars in US, Japan and Taiwan have studied Chinese military modernisation with concern, Indian scholars are yet to analyze the issue. We are still talking about an 'economic' China despite having once been the victim of a Chinese military offensive. Little research has been done on the possible correlation between an unresolved border and China's military options.
China's declaration of a defensive defence policy is, in many ways, a momentary truth and is not in harmony with its past behaviour. New literature on China's foreign policy has only substantiated this hypothesis. Beijing has always hidden facts about various aspects of its defence organization, budget and the modernisation programme. The current white paper is no different. China has still miles to go before it can convince other nations of its peaceful intentions.
Note: The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect those of his organization.
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