Has India's Military Diplomacy Come of Age?
Bhartendu Kumar Singh
Indian Defence Accounts Service
The
Sino-Indian 'Hand-in-Hand 2008' military exercise that concluded recently at Belgaum in Karnataka may have hit headlines, but is no revelation to those who have observed India's military diplomacy in recent times. China apart, India has engaged many countries this year alone, under the rubric of military diplomacy. While the Navy led the show, with many bilateral and multilateral exercises, the Air Force and the Army too engaged themselves in significant joint exercises.
This new found confidence and proliferation in India's military diplomacy leads
to the question if India's military diplomacy has come of age.
The
credit for new military diplomacy goes to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,
who introduced new political perspectives, seeking a commensurate military role
for India in Asian international relations, in keeping with its rising economic
and political profile. As the Minster of State for Defence Pallam Raju said
at this year's Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, "one of the long-term
challenges for India was its willingness and ability to contribute to public
good." Hence, in the past few years, India has entered into defence cooperation
agreements with most great powers, including China, as also with smaller countries
like Malaysia and Singapore, and even Mauritius. The Manmohan Singh doctrine
has also been backed by the strategic consensus, in tackling common security
threats through cooperative security along with other countries. Indian strategic
thinkers have been quick to realise the potential of the cooperative security
mechanisms, that offer cost effective security and a win-win scenario for every
country, through a non-zero sum game approach.
The
tangible gains are already visible. First, military diplomacy has helped in
reducing tensions with China and allowed the two countries to explore the
potentialities of a partnership in the emerging Asian security architecture. One
can raise the issue of Pakistan, but that country is yet to acknowledge the
utility of military diplomacy. Second, it has allowed India to share its own
experience and knowledge with other countries and learn from their experiences.
Witness for example, this year's inaugural Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)
gathering at New Delhi, which allowed the Indian Navy different perspectives on
contemporary maritime security. Third, it has enabled India to ensure enhanced
policing of the adjacent waters in the Indian Ocean region, through sharing of
intelligence with other countries. India's capability to curb piracy and other
subversive activities in the region has definitely increased as witnessed in the
recent sinking of pirate ships in the Gulf of Aden by the Indian Navy. Fourth,
it has allowed India to maintain a peaceful periphery and project its power in a
discreet and subtle manner, that empathies with the maritime needs and
aspirations of small littoral countries in the region.
India's
military diplomacy is, however, not a fairy tale story. First, the basket of
military diplomacy is still limited to a few countries, as also limited in
numbers. While India's late start is certainly responsible for that, there has
also been some domestic ideological opposition to military exchanges with
countries like the US. Often, they fail to factor in strategic advantages that
accrue from such collaboration. Second, India is not able to harness military
diplomacy due to the demand-supply disequilibrium with military modernisation.
While countries like China have made considerable investments in military modernisation,
India lags behind. Third, India still does not have diplomatic presence in many
of the continental countries in Africa as well as littoral countries of the
Indian Ocean region. Also, its trade linkages with these countries are very
shallow so as to create 'stakes' for these countries. Much of the military diplomatic
activities are, therefore, born out of agreements reached with individual countries,
rather than being part of a grand strategy. Fourth, often external factors tend
to neutralise India's military diplomacy. Witness for example, the recent spate
of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, which could be attributed to utter lawlessness
in Somalia. The ongoing crisis in Congo has posed a moral dilemma for Indian
peacekeepers, due to the emergence of hostile elements and a perceptible shift
towards a different mandate. Fifth, there are significant players competing
with India with more resources and lucrative terms of engagement. China, for
example, has institutionalised military diplomacy not only in the Indian Ocean
but also on the continents of Africa and Latin America. ASEAN has institutionalised
dialogue platforms to engage the militaries of significant countries that matter
to the group.
With
so many challenges, India's military diplomacy is yet to catch up with its
rising power status. With the security situation in South Asia as well as the
larger neighbourhood constantly fluctuating, India should focus on re-inventing
the basket of military diplomacy. It could probably learn from the Chinese experience
that is based on the judicious balance of military diplomacy and military modernisation,
synergy with political and economic diplomacy and above all, securing its periphery
through the cooperative security route.